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Optimal Transfers and Participation Decisions in International Environmental Agreements

  • Carlo Carraro

    (University of Venice)

  • Johan Eyckmans

    (Europese Hogeschool Brussel and Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën)

  • Michael Finus

    (University of Hagen)

The literature on international environmental agreements has recognized the role transfers play in encouraging participation in international environmental agreements (IEAs), but the few results achieved so far are overly specific and do not exploit the full potential of transfers for successful treaty-making. Therefore, in this paper, we develop a framework that enables us to study the role of transfers in a more systematic way. We propose a design for transfers using both internal and external financial resources and making “welfare optimal agreements” self-enforcing. To illustrate the relevance of our transfer scheme for actual treaty-making, we use a well-known integrated assessment model of climate change to show how appropriate transfers may be able to induce almost all countries into signing a self-enforcing climate treaty.

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Paper provided by Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei in its series Working Papers with number 2005.50.

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Date of creation: Apr 2005
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Handle: RePEc:fem:femwpa:2005.50
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  1. Johan Eyckmans & Michael Finus, 2004. "An Almost Ideal Sharing Scheme for Coalition Games with Externalities," Working Papers 2004.155, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  2. Hans-Peter Weikard & Michael Finus & Juan-Carlos Altamirano-Cabrera, 2006. "The impact of surplus sharing on the stability of international climate agreements," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 58(2), pages 209-232, April.
  3. EYCKMANS, Johan & TULKENS, Henry, . "Simulating coalitionally stable burden sharing agreements for the climate change problem," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1677, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  4. d'ASPREMONT, Claude & JACQUEMIN, Alexis & GABSZEWICZ, Jean J. & WEYMARK, John A., . "On the stability of collusive price leadership," CORE Discussion Papers RP -522, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  5. CHANDER, Parkash & TULKENS, Henry, 1995. "The Core of an Economy with Multilateral Environmental Externalities," CORE Discussion Papers 1995050, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  6. Parkash Chander & Henry Tulkens, 1995. "A core-theoretic solution for the design of cooperative agreements on transfrontier pollution," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 2(2), pages 279-293, August.
  7. Juan-Carlos Altamirano-Cabrera & Michael Finus, 2006. "Permit trading and stability of international climate agreements," Journal of Applied Economics, Universidad del CEMA, vol. 0, pages 19-48, May.
  8. Johan Eyckmans & Michael Finus, 2004. "An Empirical Assessment of Measures to Enhance the Success of Global Climate Treaties," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0406, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën, Energy, Transport and Environment.
  9. Michael Hoel & Kerstin Schneider, 1997. "Incentives to participate in an international environmental agreement," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 9(2), pages 153-170, March.
  10. Valentina Bosetti & Carlo Carraro & Massimo Tavoni, 2009. "Climate Policy after 2012," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo, vol. 55(2), pages 235-254, June.
  11. Carraro, Carlo & Siniscalco, Domenico, 1991. "Strategies for the International Protection of the Environment," CEPR Discussion Papers 568, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  12. Johan Eyckmans & Michael Finus, 2007. "Measures to enhance the success of global climate treaties," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 73-97, March.
  13. Barrett, Scott, 2001. "International cooperation for sale," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(10), pages 1835-1850, December.
  14. Martin L. Weitzman, 2001. "Gamma Discounting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(1), pages 260-271, March.
  15. Kaitala, Veijo & Maler, Karl-Goran & Tulkens, Henry, 1995. " The Acid Rain Game as a Resource Allocation Process with an Application to the International Cooperation among Finland, Russia and Estonia," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 97(2), pages 325-43, June.
  16. Bosello, Francesco & Buchner, Barbara & Carraro, Carlo & Raggi, Davide, 2003. "Can Equity Enhance Efficiency? Some Lessons from Climate Negotiations," CEPR Discussion Papers 3606, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  17. Johan Eyckmans & Michael Finus, 2003. "Coalition Formation in a Global Warming Game: How the Design of Protocols Affects the Success of Environmental Treaty-Making," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0317, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën, Energy, Transport and Environment.
  18. Finus, Michael & Sáiz, M. Elena & Hendrix, Eligius M.T., 2009. "An empirical test of new developments in coalition theory for the design of international environmental agreements," Environment and Development Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 14(01), pages 117-137, February.
  19. Francesco Bosello & Barbara Buchner & Carlo Carraro, 2003. "Equity, Development, and Climate Change Control," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(2-3), pages 601-611, 04/05.
  20. Carraro, Carlo & Siniscalco, Domenico, 1998. "International Institutions and Environmental Policy: International environmental agreements: Incentives and political economy1," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 561-572, May.
  21. Michael Hoel, 1992. "International environment conventions: The case of uniform reductions of emissions," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 2(2), pages 141-159, March.
  22. GERMAIN , Marc & TOINT , Philippe & TULKENS, Henry, 1997. "Financial transfers to ensure cooperative international optimality in stock pollutant abatement," CORE Discussion Papers 1997001, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  23. TULKENS, Henry, 1997. "Cooperation vs. free riding in international environmental affairs: two approaches," CORE Discussion Papers 1997052, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  24. Petrakis, Emmanuel & Xepapadeas, Anastasios, 1996. "Environmental consciousness and moral hazard in international agreements to protect the environment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 95-110, April.
  25. Barrett, Scott, 1994. "Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(0), pages 878-94, Supplemen.
  26. Nordhaus, William D & Yang, Zili, 1996. "A Regional Dynamic General-Equilibrium Model of Alternative Climate-Change Strategies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(4), pages 741-65, September.
  27. Buchholz, Wolfgang & Konrad, Kai A., 1995. "Strategic transfers and private provision of public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(3), pages 489-505, July.
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