IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Financial transfers to ensure cooperative international optimality in stock pollutant abatement

  • GERMAINÂ , Marc

    (Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), Université catholique de Louvain (UCL), Louvain la Neuve, Belgium)

  • TOINTÂ , Philippe

    (Département de Mathématique, Facultés universitaires Notre-Dame de la Paix,)

  • TULKENS, Henry

    ()

    (Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), Université catholique de Louvain (UCL), Louvain la Neuve, Belgium)

It is well known that the transnational character of many environmental problems requires cooperation amongst the countries involved, if a social optimum is at all to be achieved. Most of the numerous contributions dealing with the problems raised by the cooperation issue bear only on pollutants that do not accumulate: they are thus only relevant in a static, or a-temporal, context. On the other hand, many contributions which deal with the dynamic dimension of the problem when the pollutant accumulates leave aside the issue of the voluntary implementation of the international optimum. The aim of the present contribution is to overtake the two above limita- tions. Using both cooperative and differential game theories, we design a scheme of financial transfers between countries such that aggregate abatement costs are covered in a way that makes cooperation both individually rational and strategically stable.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://alfresco.uclouvain.be/alfresco/download/attach/workspace/SpacesStore/52d6522b-4cd6-4395-9760-37b59f53da16/coredp_1997_01.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers with number 1997001.

as
in new window

Length:
Date of creation: 01 Jan 1997
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:1997001
Contact details of provider: Postal: Voie du Roman Pays 34, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgium)
Phone: 32(10)474321
Fax: +32 10474304
Web page: http://www.uclouvain.be/core
Email:


More information through EDIRC

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:1997001. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Alain GILLIS)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.