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The formation of an international environmental agreement as a two-stage exclusive cartel formation game with transferable utilities

  • Porchiung Chou

    ()

  • Cheickna Sylla

    ()

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    No abstract is available for this item.

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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10784-008-9082-6
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    Article provided by Springer in its journal International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics.

    Volume (Year): 8 (2008)
    Issue (Month): 4 (December)
    Pages: 317-341

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    Handle: RePEc:spr:ieaple:v:8:y:2008:i:4:p:317-341
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.springer.com/economics/journal/10784

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    1. Germain, M. & Toint, Ph. & Tulkens, H. & de Zeeuw, A.J., 2003. "Transfers to sustain dynamic core-theoretic cooperation in international stock pollutant control," Other publications TiSEM 8953bc6e-fc65-4fd7-a2d1-6, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    2. Van Der Ploeg, F. & De Zeeuw, A.J., 1990. "International Aspects Of Pollution Control," Papers 9065, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
    3. Hans-Peter Weikard & Michael Finus & Juan-Carlos Altamirano-Cabrera, 2006. "The impact of surplus sharing on the stability of international climate agreements," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 58(2), pages 209-232, April.
    4. Carraro, Carlo & Siniscalco, Domenico, 1991. "Strategies for the International Protection of the Environment," CEPR Discussion Papers 568, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. GERMAIN, Marc & VAN YPERSELE, Jean-Pascal, 1999. "Financial transfers to sustain international cooperation in the climate change framework," CORE Discussion Papers 1999036, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    6. BRECHET, Thierry & GERARD, François & TULKENS, Henry, 2007. "Climate coalitions: a theoretical and computational appraisal," CORE Discussion Papers 2007003, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    7. CHANDER, Parkash & TULKENS, Henry & VAN YPERSELE, Jean - Pascal & WILLEMS, Stefane, 1999. "The Kyoto protocol: an economic and game theoretic interpretation," CORE Discussion Papers 1999025, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    8. Bloch, Francis, 1996. "Sequential Formation of Coalitions in Games with Externalities and Fixed Payoff Division," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 90-123, May.
    9. Carraro, Carlo & Eyckmans, Johan & Finus, Michael, 2005. "Optimal Transfers and Participation Decisions in International Environmental Agreements," CEPR Discussion Papers 5046, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    10. Michael Finus & Bianca Rundshagen, 2003. "A Non-cooperative Foundation of Core-Stability in Positive Externality NTU-Coalition Games," Working Papers 2003.31, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    11. Johan Eyckmans & Michael Finus, 2006. "New roads to international environmental agreements: the case of global warming," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 7(4), pages 391-414, December.
    12. Yi, Sang-Seung, 1997. "Stable Coalition Structures with Externalities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 201-237, August.
    13. Chander, P. & Tulkens, H., . "A core-theoretic solution for the design of cooperative agreements on transfrontier pollution," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1158, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    14. FIGUIÈRES, Charles & VERDONCK, Magali, 2003. "On the core of an economy with multilateral and multidimensional environmental externalities," CORE Discussion Papers 2003004, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    15. Hans-Peter Weikard, 2009. "Cartel Stability Under An Optimal Sharing Rule," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 77(5), pages 575-593, 09.
    16. Chander, P. & Tulkens, H., . "The core of an economy with multilateral environmental externalities," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1276, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    17. Michael Finus & Bianca Rundshagen, 2003. "How the Rules of Coalition Formation Affect Stability of International Environmental Agreements," Working Papers 2003.62, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    18. Na, Seong-lin & Shin, Hyun Song, 1998. "International Environmental Agreements under Uncertainty," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 50(2), pages 173-85, April.
    19. TULKENS, Henry, 1997. "Cooperation vs. free riding in international environmental affairs: two approaches," CORE Discussion Papers 1997052, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    20. EYCKMANS, Johan & TULKENS, Henry, . "Simulating coalitionally stable burden sharing agreements for the climate change problem," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1677, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    21. GERMAIN , Marc & TOINT , Philippe & TULKENS, Henry, 1997. "Financial transfers to ensure cooperative international optimality in stock pollutant abatement," CORE Discussion Papers 1997001, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    22. CHANDER, Parkash & TULKENS, Henry, . "Theoretical foundations of negotiations and cost sharing in transfrontier pollution problems," CORE Discussion Papers RP -983, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    23. Germain, Marc & Toint, Philippe & Tulkens, Henry & de Zeeuw, Aart, 2003. "Transfers to sustain dynamic core-theoretic cooperation in international stock pollutant control," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 79-99, October.
    24. Johan Eyckmans & Michael Finus, 2004. "An Almost Ideal Sharing Scheme for Coalition Games with Externalities," Working Papers 2004.155, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    25. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2003:i:3:p:1-10 is not listed on IDEAS
    26. Hart, Sergiu & Kurz, Mordecai, 1983. "Endogenous Formation of Coalitions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(4), pages 1047-64, July.
    27. Parkash Chander, 2003. "The ?-Core and Coalition Formation," Working Papers 2003.94, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
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