IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

International Environmental Agreements with Asymmetric Countries

  • Marta Biancardi


  • Giovanni Villani


Registered author(s):

    The paper investigates the stability of the International Environmental Agreement in a model of emission reduction. We consider a two stage game, in which in the first stage each country decides whether or not to join the agreement while, in the second stage, the quantity of emissions reduction is chosen. Agents may act cooperatively, building coalitions and acting according to the interest of the coalition, or they make their choices taking care of their individual interest only. Unlike conventional coalition stability models, we assume that countries are not identical but they are divided in two different kinds: developing countries and developed ones; the first have a lower attention about environmental pollution than developed ones. According to environmental awareness, stable coalitions of different sizes occur. On this subject, we present a Maple algorithm to compute the optimal costs and the abatement level for each coalition forms assuming an arbitrary number of developed and developing countries and to determine the internal and the external stability. In order to expand a coalition of any size to the grand coalition, which reaches the greatest abatement level and the lowest aggregate costs, we introduce monetary transfers.

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: no

    Paper provided by Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Matematiche e Statistiche, Universita' di Foggia in its series Quaderni DSEMS with number 09-2009.

    in new window

    Length: 21 pages
    Date of creation: May 2009
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:ufg:qdsems:09-2009
    Contact details of provider: Postal: Largo Papa Giovanni Paolo II, 1 -71100- Foggia (I)
    Phone: +390881753722
    Fax: +390881775616
    Web page:

    More information through EDIRC

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

    as in new window
    1. Aart de Zeeuw, 2005. "Dynamic Effects on the Stability of International Environmental Agreements," Working Papers 2005.41, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    2. Barrett, Scott, 1994. "Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(0), pages 878-94, Supplemen.
    3. Carlo Carraro & Johan Eyckmans & Michael Finus, 2006. "Optimal transfers and participation decisions in international environmental agreements," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 1(4), pages 379-396, December.
    4. Chander, P. & Tulkens, H., . "A core-theoretic solution for the design of cooperative agreements on transfrontier pollution," CORE Discussion Papers RP 1158, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    5. Claude d'Aspremont & Alexis Jacquemin & Jean Jaskold Gabszewicz & John A. Weymark, 1983. "On the Stability of Collusive Price Leadership," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 16(1), pages 17-25, February.
    6. Carraro, Carlo & Siniscalco, Domenico, 1993. "Strategies for the international protection of the environment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 309-328, October.
    7. Effrosyni Diamantoudi & Sartzetakis, Eftichios, . "Stable International Environmental Agreements: An Analytical Approach," Economics Working Papers 2001-10, School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus.
    8. CHANDER, Parkash & TULKENS, Henry, . "Theoretical foundations of negotiations and cost sharing in transfrontier pollution problems," CORE Discussion Papers RP 983, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    9. Porchiung Chou & Cheickna Sylla, 2008. "The formation of an international environmental agreement as a two-stage exclusive cartel formation game with transferable utilities," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 8(4), pages 317-341, December.
    10. Chander, P. & Tulkens, H., . "The core of an economy with multilateral environmental externalities," CORE Discussion Papers RP 1276, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    11. Alistair Ulph & Santiago J. Rubio, 2004. "Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements Revisited," Working Papers. Serie AD 2004-23, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    12. Michael Hoel, 1992. "International environment conventions: The case of uniform reductions of emissions," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 2(2), pages 141-159, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ufg:qdsems:09-2009. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Luca Grilli)

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.