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The effects of R&D investments in international environmental agreements with asymmetric countries

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  • Biancardi, Marta
  • Villani, Giovanni

Abstract

The paper examines the stability of international environmental agreements (IEAs) in a dynamic context where abatement levels are associated with the stock pollutant evolution. We underline two meaningful aspects of this matter. Firstly, we consider asymmetry among countries, dividing them in two types: developed countries that have a considerable environmental awareness and developing ones that pay a less attention to environmental preservation. Secondly, we introduce a positive externality in the cooperation where countries coordinate their R&D activities sharing the investments in order to avoid duplication of green activities. Otherwise, the non-cooperators support completely their R&D investments for clean technologies. These two aspects encourage the formation of stable coalitions till to determine conditions for which also the grand coalition is stable.

Suggested Citation

  • Biancardi, Marta & Villani, Giovanni, 2015. "The effects of R&D investments in international environmental agreements with asymmetric countries," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 30-39.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:chsofr:v:79:y:2015:i:c:p:30-39
    DOI: 10.1016/j.chaos.2015.07.026
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • F50 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - General
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • F42 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - International Policy Coordination and Transmission
    • O32 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D

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