IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Can altruism stabilise international climate agreements?

  • van der Pol, Thomas
  • Weikard, Hans-Peter
  • van Ierland, Ekko

We study the impact of altruism on the stability of international climate agreements. We consider the standard two-stage game for the analysis of international environmental agreements where countries announce their participation at the first stage and abatement levels are chosen at the second stage. We modify the game to consider altruism in the participation decision, i.e. countries consider, to a certain extent, the net benefits for other countries in their decisions. We study two types of altruism: impartial altruism, where countries show a concern for all other countries, and community altruism, where the concern extends only to coalition partners. We use the stability of coalitions model (STACO) to illustrate the impacts of both types of altruism on the stability of a climate agreement. We find that a limited degree of altruism is sufficient to stabilise the Grand Coalition such that a globally efficient climate policy can emerge while in the absence of altruism only a fraction of countries would join a climate agreement and the benefits of cooperation would largely remain unexploited. Our results indicate how moving beyond national interests can support the success of international climate agreements.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0921800912002364
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Ecological Economics.

Volume (Year): 81 (2012)
Issue (Month): C ()
Pages: 112-120

as
in new window

Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolec:v:81:y:2012:i:c:p:112-120
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolecon

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ecolec:v:81:y:2012:i:c:p:112-120. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.