IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Technology Spillovers and Stability of International Climate Coalitions

  • Miyuki Nagashima

    (Wageningen University)

  • Rob Dellink

    (Wageningen University and Institute for Environmental Studies, VU University of Amsterdam)

Cooperation in international environmental agreements appears difficult to attain because of strong free-riding incentives. This paper explores how different technology spillover mechanisms among regions can influence the incentive structures to join and stabilise an international agreement. We use an applied modelling framework (STACO) that enables us to investigate stability of partial climate coalitions. Technology spillovers to coalition members increase their incentives to stay in the coalition and reduce abatement costs, which leads to larger global payoffs and a lower global CO2 stock. Several theories on the impact of technology spillovers are evaluated by simulating a range of alternative specifications. We find that while spillovers are a good instrument to improve stability of bilateral agreements, they cannot overcome the strong free rider incentives that are present in larger coalitions. This conclusion is robust against the specification of technology spillovers.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL:
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei in its series Working Papers with number 2007.98.

in new window

Date of creation: Nov 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fem:femwpa:2007.98
Contact details of provider: Postal: Corso Magenta, 63 - 20123 Milan
Phone: 0039-2-52036934
Fax: 0039-2-52036946
Web page:

More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. World Bank, 2003. "World Development Indicators 2003," World Bank Publications, The World Bank, number 13920.
  2. Buchner, Barbara & Carraro, Carlo, 2005. "Modelling climate policy: Perspectives on future negotiations," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 27(6), pages 711-732, September.
  3. Paul Romer, 1989. "Endogenous Technological Change," NBER Working Papers 3210, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Aart de Zeeuw, 2005. "Dynamic Effects on the Stability of International Environmental Agreements," Working Papers 2005.41, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  5. Chander, Parkash & Tulkens, Henry, 1994. "The Core of an Economy With Multilateral Environmental Externalities," Working Papers 886, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  6. Hans-Peter Weikard, 2009. "Cartel Stability Under An Optimal Sharing Rule," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 77(5), pages 575-593, 09.
  7. Buonanno, Paolo & Carraro, Carlo & Galeotti, Marzio, 2003. "Endogenous induced technical change and the costs of Kyoto," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 11-34, February.
  8. Michael Hoel & Kerstin Schneider, 1997. "Incentives to participate in an international environmental agreement," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 9(2), pages 153-170, March.
  9. Carlo Carraro & Johan Eyckmans & Michael Finus, 2006. "Optimal transfers and participation decisions in international environmental agreements," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 1(4), pages 379-396, December.
  10. Kemfert, Claudia, 2004. "Climate coalitions and international trade: assessment of cooperation incentives by issue linkage," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 32(4), pages 455-465, March.
  11. Richard S.J. Tol & Wietze Lise & Benoit Morel & Bob C.C. van der Zwaan, 2001. "Technology Development And Diffusion And Incentives To Abate Greenhouse Gas Emissions," Working Papers FNU-6, Research unit Sustainability and Global Change, Hamburg University, revised Feb 2001.
  12. Chander, P. & Tulkens, H., . "A core-theoretic solution for the design of cooperative agreements on transfrontier pollution," CORE Discussion Papers RP 1158, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  13. Downing, Paul B. & White, Lawrence J., 1986. "Innovation in pollution control," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 18-29, March.
  14. Löschel, Andreas, 2001. "Technological change in economic models of environmental policy: a survey," ZEW Discussion Papers 01-62, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
  15. Claudia Kemfert & Wietze Lise & Richard Tol, 2004. "Games of Climate Change with International Trade," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 28(2), pages 209-232, June.
  16. Sandler, Todd & Tschirhart, John, 1997. " Club Theory: Thirty Years Later," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 93(3-4), pages 335-55, December.
  17. Yoram Bauman & Myunghun Lee & Karl Seeley, 2008. "Does Technological Innovation Really Reduce Marginal Abatement Costs? Some Theory, Algebraic Evidence, and Policy Implications," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 40(4), pages 507-527, August.
  18. Baker, Erin & Clarke, Leon & Shittu, Ekundayo, 2008. "Technical change and the marginal cost of abatement," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(6), pages 2799-2816, November.
  19. Oran R. Young, 2003. "Environment and Statecraft: The Strategy of Environmental Treaty-Making," Global Environmental Politics, MIT Press, vol. 3(1), pages 145-147, 02.
  20. Valentina Bosetti & David Tomberlin, 2004. "Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei," Working Papers 2004.102, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  21. Golombek, Rolf & Hoel, Michael, 2003. "Climate Policy under Technology Spillovers," Memorandum 22/2003, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
  22. Todd Sandler, 2006. "Regional public goods and international organizations," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 5-25, March.
  23. Hans-Peter Weikard & Michael Finus & Juan-Carlos Altamirano-Cabrera, 2006. "The impact of surplus sharing on the stability of international climate agreements," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 58(2), pages 209-232, April.
  24. Michael Finus & Ekko van Ierland, 2003. "Stability of Climate Coalitions in a Cartel Formation Game," Working Papers 2003.61, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  25. Grossman, G.M. & Helpman, E., 1993. "Endogenous, Innovation in the Theory of Growth," Papers 165, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs.
  26. de Zeeuw, A.J., 2008. "Dynamic effects on the stability of international environmental agreements," Other publications TiSEM 41f27f71-d6e6-463e-9b03-f, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  27. Carraro, Carlo & Siniscalco, Domenico, 1993. "Strategies for the international protection of the environment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 309-328, October.
  28. GERMAIN, Marc & VAN STEENBERGHE, Vincent, 2001. "Constraining equitable allocations of tradable greenhouse gases emission quotas by acceptability," CORE Discussion Papers 2001005, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fem:femwpa:2007.98. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (barbara racah)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.