Research cooperation and international standards in a model of coalition stability
Suggestions on international cooperation in climate policy beyond 2012 include substituting or complementing international environmental agreements (IEA) with technology-oriented agreements (TOA). We look at the impact of TOA on environmental cooperation in a framework of coalition stability. Using a numerical model, we analyze the differences of several TOA and how they interact. We find that participation in and environmental effectiveness of the IEA are raised less effectively when the TOA focuses on research cooperation in mitigation technology rather than cooperation on augmenting productivity in the private good sector. This is due to the former having an effect on all actors via emissions, whereas effects of the latter are exclusive to research partners. For the same reason, we find that restricting research cooperation to the coalition is only credible when it focuses on productivity. Technology standards that reduce the emission intensity of production are unlikely to raise participation by themselves and may suffer from inefficiencies. However, these disadvantages do not apply when standards are implemented as a complementary instrument. Separately negotiated technology standards may hence facilitate participation in an IEA without adding to its complexity.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Kemfert, Claudia, 2004. "Climate coalitions and international trade: assessment of cooperation incentives by issue linkage," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 32(4), pages 455-465, March.
- Rolf Golombek & Michael Hoel, 2011.
"International Cooperation on Climate-friendly Technologies,"
Environmental & Resource Economics,
Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 49(4), pages 473-490, August.
- Rolf Golombek & Michael Hoel, 2009. "International Cooperation on Climate-Friendly Technologies," CESifo Working Paper Series 2677, CESifo Group Munich.
- Barbara Buchner & Carlo Carraro, 2006.
"‘US, China and the Economics of Climate Negotiations’,"
International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics,
Springer, vol. 6(1), pages 63-89, 03.
- Carlo Carraro & Barbara Buchner, 2006. "US, China and the economics of climate negotiations," Working Papers 2006_07, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".
- Parkash Chander & Henry Tulkens, 1995.
"A core-theoretic solution for the design of cooperative agreements on transfrontier pollution,"
International Tax and Public Finance,
Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 2(2), pages 279-293, August.
- CHANDER, Parkash & TULKENS, Henry, 1994. "A Core-Theoretic Solution for the Design of Cooperative Agreements on Transfrontier Pollution," CORE Discussion Papers 1994048, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Chander, P. & Tulkens, H., . "A core-theoretic solution for the design of cooperative agreements on transfrontier pollution," CORE Discussion Papers RP 1158, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Chander, Parkash & Tulkens, Henry, 1994. "A Core-Theoretic Solution for the Design of Cooperative Agreements on Transfrontier Pollution," Working Papers 897, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Edenhofer, Ottmar & Bauer, Nico & Kriegler, Elmar, 2005. "The impact of technological change on climate protection and welfare: Insights from the model MIND," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(2-3), pages 277-292, August.
- Miyuki Nagashima & Rob Dellink, 2007.
"Technology Spillovers and Stability of International Climate Coalitions,"
2007.98, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Miyuki Nagashima & Rob Dellink, 2008. "Technology spillovers and stability of international climate coalitions," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 8(4), pages 343-365, December.
- Barrett, Scott, 1994. "Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(0), pages 878-94, Supplemen.
- EYCKMANS, Johan & TULKENS, Henry, 1999.
"Simulating coalitionally stable burden sharing agreements for the climate change problem,"
CORE Discussion Papers
1999026, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Eyckmans, Johan & Tulkens, Henry, 2003. "Simulating coalitionally stable burden sharing agreements for the climate change problem," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(4), pages 299-327, October.
- Michael Finus & Ekko Ierland & Rob Dellink, 2006.
"Stability of Climate Coalitions in a Cartel Formation Game,"
Economics of Governance,
Springer, vol. 7(3), pages 271-291, August.
- Michael Finus & Ekko van Ierland, 2003. "Stability of Climate Coalitions in a Cartel Formation Game," Working Papers 2003.61, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Montero, Juan-Pablo, 2002. "Permits, Standards, and Technology Innovation," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 23-44, July.
- Stephen J. Turnovsky, 2000. "Methods of Macroeconomic Dynamics, 2nd Edition," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 2, volume 1, number 0262201232, December.
- Golombek, Rolf & Hoel, Michael, 2006.
"Endogenous technology and tradable emission quotas,"
03/2006, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
- Golombek, Rolf & Hoel, Michael, 2008. "Endogenous technology and tradable emission quotas," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 197-208, May.
- Michael Hoel & Rolf Golombek, 2006. "Endogenous Technology and Tradable Emission Quotas," Working Papers 2006.42, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Richard Kneller, 2005. "Frontier Technology, Absorptive Capacity and Distance," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, vol. 67(1), pages 1-23, 02.
- Scott Barrett & Robert Stavins, 2003.
"Increasing Participation and Compliance in International Climate Change Agreements,"
International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics,
Springer, vol. 3(4), pages 349-376, December.
- Barrett, Scott & Stavins, Robert, 2002. "Increasing Participation and Compliance in International Climate Change Agreements," Working Paper Series rwp02-031, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
- Hagedoorn, John & Link, Albert N. & Vonortas, Nicholas S., 2000. "Research partnerships1," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 29(4-5), pages 567-586, April.
- Carraro, Carlo & Siniscalco, Domenico, 1993.
"Strategies for the international protection of the environment,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 309-328, October.
- Carraro, Carlo & Siniscalco, Domenico, 1991. "Strategies for the International Protection of the Environment," CEPR Discussion Papers 568, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Finus, Michael, 2008. "Game Theoretic Research on the Design of International Environmental Agreements: Insights, Critical Remarks, and Future Challenges," International Review of Environmental and Resource Economics, now publishers, vol. 2(1), pages 29-67, June.
- Requate, Till, 2005. "Dynamic incentives by environmental policy instruments--a survey," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(2-3), pages 175-195, August.
- Ottmar Edenhofer, Kai Lessmann, Claudia Kemfert, Michael Grubb and Jonathan Kohler, 2006. "Induced Technological Change: Exploring its Implications for the Economics of Atmospheric Stabilization: Synthesis Report from the Innovation Modeling Comparison Project," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Special I), pages 57-108.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:resene:v:33:y:2011:i:1:p:36-54. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Shamier, Wendy)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.