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Research cooperation and international standards in a model of coalition stability

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  • Lessmann, Kai
  • Edenhofer, Ottmar

Abstract

Suggestions on international cooperation in climate policy beyond 2012 include substituting or complementing international environmental agreements (IEA) with technology-oriented agreements (TOA). We look at the impact of TOA on environmental cooperation in a framework of coalition stability. Using a numerical model, we analyze the differences of several TOA and how they interact. We find that participation in and environmental effectiveness of the IEA are raised less effectively when the TOA focuses on research cooperation in mitigation technology rather than cooperation on augmenting productivity in the private good sector. This is due to the former having an effect on all actors via emissions, whereas effects of the latter are exclusive to research partners. For the same reason, we find that restricting research cooperation to the coalition is only credible when it focuses on productivity. Technology standards that reduce the emission intensity of production are unlikely to raise participation by themselves and may suffer from inefficiencies. However, these disadvantages do not apply when standards are implemented as a complementary instrument. Separately negotiated technology standards may hence facilitate participation in an IEA without adding to its complexity.

Suggested Citation

  • Lessmann, Kai & Edenhofer, Ottmar, 2011. "Research cooperation and international standards in a model of coalition stability," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 36-54, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:resene:v:33:y:2011:i:1:p:36-54
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Hans-Peter Weikard & Leo Wangler & Andreas Freytag, 2015. "Minimum Participation Rules with Heterogeneous Countries," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 62(4), pages 711-727, December.
    2. Kai Lessmann & Ulrike Kornek & Valentina Bosetti & Rob Dellink & Johannes Emmerling & Johan Eyckmans & Miyuki Nagashima & Hans-Peter Weikard & Zili Yang, 2014. "The Stability and Effectiveness of Climate Coalitions: A Comparative Analysis of Multiple Integrated Assessment Models," Working Papers 2014.05, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    3. Thierry Brechet and Henry Tulkens, 2015. "Climate Policies: A Burden, or a Gain?," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 3).
    4. KORNEK, Urik & LESSMANN, Kai & TULKENS, Henry, 2014. "Transferable and non transferable utility implementations of coalitional stability in integrated assessment models," CORE Discussion Papers 2014035, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    5. El-Sayed, Abeer & Rubio, Santiago J., 2014. "Sharing R&D investments in cleaner technologies to mitigate climate change," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 168-180.
    6. Michael Hübler & Michael Finus, 2013. "Is the risk of North–South technology transfer failure an obstacle to a cooperative climate change agreement?," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 13(4), pages 461-479, November.
    7. Kai Lessmann & Ulrike Kornek & Valentina Bosetti & Rob Dellink & Johannes Emmerling & Johan Eyckmans & Miyuki Nagashima & Hans-Peter Weikard & Zili Yang, 2015. "The Stability and Effectiveness of Climate Coalitions," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 62(4), pages 811-836, December.
    8. Fabio Sferra & Massimo Tavoni, 2013. "Endogenous Participation in a Partial Climate Agreement with Open Entry: A Numerical Assessment," Working Papers 2013.60, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    9. Kai Lessmann & Robert Marschinski & Michael Finus & Ulrike Kornek & Ottmar Edenhofer, 2014. "Emissions Trading with Non-signatories in a Climate Agreement—an Analysis of Coalition Stability," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 82, pages 82-109, December.
    10. Jin, Wei, 2016. "International technology diffusion, multilateral R&D coordination, and global climate mitigation," Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 357-372.
    11. Eftichios Sartzetakis & Stefania Strantza, 2013. "International Environmental Agreements: An Emission Choice Model with Abatement Technology," Discussion Paper Series 2013_05, Department of Economics, University of Macedonia, revised Dec 2013.
    12. repec:spr:ieaple:v:17:y:2017:i:6:d:10.1007_s10784-017-9352-2 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Wei Jin, 2012. "International Knowledge Spillover and Technology Externality: Why Multilateral R&D Coordination Matters for Global Climate Governance," CAMA Working Papers 2012-53, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University.
    14. Ottmar Edenhofer & Christian Flachsland, 2012. "Die Nutzung globaler Gemeinschaftsgüter: Politökonomische Herausforderungen an die Klimapolitik," ifo Schnelldienst, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 65(12), pages 29-35, June.

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