Game Theoretic Research on the Design of International Environmental Agreements: Insights, Critical Remarks, and Future Challenges
In recent years, the number of publications that analyze the formation and stability of international environmental agreements (IEAs) using the method of game theory has sharply increased. This paper reports on some recent results that shall demonstrate the usefulness but also the limitation of game theory for the analysis of IEAs. It restricts attention to the class of non-cooperative membership models and focuses on the relation between different designs and the success of IEAs. Results are illustrated for the climate change problem with the empirical Stability of Coalitions (STACO) model developed by Dellink et al. (2004). Subsequently, some features of actual treaty-making not considered with this model are discussed with reference to the literature and their importance for future research is highlighted.
Volume (Year): 2 (2008)
Issue (Month): 1 (June)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.nowpublishers.com/ |
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:now:jirere:101.00000011. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Alet Heezemans)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.