Increasing Participation and Compliance in International Climate Change Agreements
Scientific and economic consensus increasingly points to the need for a credible and cost-effective approach to address the threat of global climate change, but the Kyoto Protocol to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change appears incapable of inducing significant participation and compliance. We assess the Protocol and thirteen alternative policy architectures that have been proposed, with particular attention to their respective abilities to induce participation and compliance. We find that those approaches that offer cost-effective mitigation are unlikely to induce significant participation and compliance, while the approaches that are likely to enjoy a reasonably high level of implementation by sovereign states are sorely lacking in terms of their anticipated cost effectiveness. The feasible set of policy architectures is thus limited to second-best alternatives. Much more attention needs to be given -- both by scholarly research and by international negotiations -- to aspects of future international climate agreements that will affect the degrees of participation and compliance that can reasonably be expected to be forthcoming.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 3 (2003)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.springer.com|
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.springer.com/economics/journal/10784|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Stavins, Robert, 2000.
"Experience with Market-Based Environmental Policy Instruments,"
Working Paper Series
rwp00-004, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
- Stavins, Robert N., 2003. "Experience with market-based environmental policy instruments," Handbook of Environmental Economics, in: K. G. Mäler & J. R. Vincent (ed.), Handbook of Environmental Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 9, pages 355-435 Elsevier.
- Stavins, Robert, 2001. "Experience with Market-Based Environmental Policy Instruments," Discussion Papers dp-01-58, Resources For the Future.
- repec:reg:rpubli:59 is not listed on IDEAS
- Carraro, Carlo & Siniscalco, Domenico, 1991.
"Strategies for the International Protection of the Environment,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
568, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Carraro, Carlo & Siniscalco, Domenico, 1993. "Strategies for the international protection of the environment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 309-328, October.
- M. L. Weitzman, 1973.
"Prices vs. Quantities,"
106, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Toman, Michael & Kolstad, Charles, 2000.
"The Economics of Climate Policy,"
dp-00-40, Resources For the Future.
- Barrett, Scott, 1998. "Political Economy of the Kyoto Protocol," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 14(4), pages 20-39, Winter.
- Randall Lutter, 2000. "Developing Countries' Greenhouse Emmissions: Uncertainty and Implications for Participation in the Kyoto Protocol," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 4), pages 93-120.
- Warwick J. McKibbin & Peter J. Wilcoxen, 1997. "A Better Way to Slow Global Climate Change," Economics and Environment Network Working Papers 9702, Australian National University, Economics and Environment Network.
- Cooper, Richard N, 2000. "International Approaches to Global Climate Change," World Bank Research Observer, World Bank Group, vol. 15(2), pages 145-72, August.
- Oran R. Young, 2003. "Environment and Statecraft: The Strategy of Environmental Treaty-Making," Global Environmental Politics, MIT Press, vol. 3(1), pages 145-147, 02.
- Brian R. Copeland & M. Scott Taylor, 2000.
"Free Trade and Global Warming: A Trade Theory View of the Kyoto Protocol,"
NBER Working Papers
7657, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Copeland, Brian R. & Taylor, M. Scott, 2005. "Free trade and global warming: a trade theory view of the Kyoto protocol," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 205-234, March.
- Copeland,B.R. & Taylor,M.S., 2000. "Free trade and global warming : a trade theory view of the Kyoto protocol," Working papers 4, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
- Stavins, Robert, 1997. "Policy Instruments for Climate Change: How Can National Governments Address a Global Problem?," Discussion Papers dp-97-11, Resources For the Future.
- repec:reg:rpubli:70 is not listed on IDEAS
- Stavins, Robert & Hahn, Robert, 1999. "What Has Kyoto Wrought? The Real Architecture of International Tradable Permit Markets," Discussion Papers dp-99-30, Resources For the Future.
- Robert N. Stavins, 1998. "What Can We Learn from the Grand Policy Experiment? Lessons from SO2 Allowance Trading," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 12(3), pages 69-88, Summer.
- repec:reg:rpubli:60 is not listed on IDEAS
- Warwick J. McKibbin, 2000.
"Moving Beyond Kyoto,"
Economics and Environment Network Working Papers
0005, Australian National University, Economics and Environment Network.
- Scott Barrett, 1999. "A Theory of Full International Cooperation," Journal of Theoretical Politics, SAGE Publishing, vol. 11(4), pages 519-541, October.
- Scott Barrett, 2002. "Consensus Treaties," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 158(4), pages 529-, December.
- Hahn, Robert W & Stavins, Robert N, 1992. "Economic Incentives for Environmental Protection: Integrating Theory and Practice," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(2), pages 464-68, May.
- Barrett, Scott, 2001. "International cooperation for sale," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(10), pages 1835-1850, December.
- Roberts, Marc J. & Spence, Michael, 1976. "Effluent charges and licenses under uncertainty," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(3-4), pages 193-208.
- Downs, George W. & Rocke, David M. & Barsoom, Peter N., 1996. "Is the good news about compliance good news about cooperation?," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 50(03), pages 379-406, June.
- Barrett, Scott, 1997. "The strategy of trade sanctions in international environmental agreements," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(4), pages 345-361, November.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:ieaple:v:3:y:2003:i:4:p:349-376. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla)or (Rebekah McClure)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.