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The Stability and Effectiveness of Climate Coalitions

Author

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  • Kai Lessmann

    ()

  • Ulrike Kornek
  • Valentina Bosetti
  • Rob Dellink
  • Johannes Emmerling
  • Johan Eyckmans
  • Miyuki Nagashima
  • Hans-Peter Weikard
  • Zili Yang

Abstract

We report results from a comparison of numerically calibrated game theoretic integrated assessment models that explore the stability and performance of international coalitions for climate change mitigation. We identify robust results concerning the incentives of different nations to commit themselves to a climate agreement and estimate the extent of greenhouse gas mitigation that can be achieved by stable agreements. We also assess the potential of transfers that redistribute the surplus of cooperation to foster the stability of climate coalitions. In contrast to much of the existing analytical game theoretical literature, we find substantial scope for self-enforcing climate coalitions in most models that close much of the abatement and welfare gap between complete absence of cooperation and full cooperation. This more positive message follows from the use of appropriate transfer schemes that are designed to counteract free riding incentives. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

Suggested Citation

  • Kai Lessmann & Ulrike Kornek & Valentina Bosetti & Rob Dellink & Johannes Emmerling & Johan Eyckmans & Miyuki Nagashima & Hans-Peter Weikard & Zili Yang, 2015. "The Stability and Effectiveness of Climate Coalitions," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 62(4), pages 811-836, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:enreec:v:62:y:2015:i:4:p:811-836
    DOI: 10.1007/s10640-015-9886-0
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Valentina Bosetti & Carlo Carraro & Marzio Galeotti & Emanuele Massetti & Massimo Tavoni, 2006. "WITCH. A World Induced Technical Change Hybrid Model," Working Papers 2006_46, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Balint, T. & Lamperti, F. & Mandel, A. & Napoletano, M. & Roventini, A. & Sapio, A., 2017. "Complexity and the Economics of Climate Change: A Survey and a Look Forward," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 138(C), pages 252-265.
    2. Baran Doda & Simon Quemin & Luca Taschini, 2017. "A Theory of Gains from Trade in Multilaterally Linked ETSs," Working Papers 1706, Chaire Economie du climat.
    3. repec:spr:ieaple:v:17:y:2017:i:6:d:10.1007_s10784-017-9352-2 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Baran Doda & Simon Quemin, 2018. "Linking Permit Markets Multilaterally," Working Papers 1804, Chaire Economie du climat.

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