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Review of Applications of Game Theory to Global Climate Agreements

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  • J. Eyckmans

Abstract

This paper reviews game theoretic approaches to develop the formation of international environmental agreements in general and climate agreements in particular. We confront cooperative and non-cooperative approaches paying special attention to heterogeneous players and transfers. Recent extensions of the basic model with respect to uncertainty and dynamics are discussed. We conclude by listing priorities for further research in economics on international environmental policy coordination.

Suggested Citation

  • J. Eyckmans, 2012. "Review of Applications of Game Theory to Global Climate Agreements," Review of Business and Economic Literature, Intersentia, vol. 57(2), pages 122-144, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:sen:rebelj:v:57:i:2:y:2012:p:122-144
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    Cited by:

    1. Bakalova, Irina & Eyckmans, Johan, 2019. "Simulating the impact of heterogeneity on stability and effectiveness of international environmental agreements," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 277(3), pages 1151-1162.
    2. Wolfgang Buchholz & Alexander Haupt & Wolfgang Peters, 2016. "Equity as a Prerequisite for Stability of Cooperation on Global Public Good Provision," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 65(1), pages 61-78, September.
    3. Kai Lessmann & Ulrike Kornek & Valentina Bosetti & Rob Dellink & Johannes Emmerling & Johan Eyckmans & Miyuki Nagashima & Hans-Peter Weikard & Zili Yang, 2015. "The Stability and Effectiveness of Climate Coalitions," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 62(4), pages 811-836, December.

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