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Dynamic Models of International Environmental Agreements: A Differential Game Approach

  • Calvo, Emilio
  • Rubio, Santiago J.

This article provides a survey of dynamic models of international environmental agreements (IEAs). The focus is on environmental problems that are caused by a stock pollutant as are the cases of the acid rain and climate change. For this reason, the survey only reviews the literature that utilizes dynamic state-space games to analyze the formation of international agreements to control pollution. The survey considers both the cooperative approach and the noncooperative approach. In the case of the latter, the survey distinguishes between the models that assume binding agreements and those that assume the contrary. An evaluation of the state of the art is presented in the conclusions along with suggestions for future research.

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File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/101.00000053
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Article provided by now publishers in its journal International Review of Environmental and Resource Economics.

Volume (Year): 6 (2013)
Issue (Month): 4 (April)
Pages: 289-339

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Handle: RePEc:now:jirere:101.00000053
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.nowpublishers.com/

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