Dynamic Models for International Environmental Agreements
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References listed on IDEAS
- Santiago J. Rubio & Alistair Ulph, 2006.
"Self-enforcing international environmental agreements revisited,"
Oxford Economic Papers,
Oxford University Press, vol. 58(2), pages 233-263, April.
- Alistair Ulph & Santiago J. Rubio, 2004. "Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements Revisited," Working Papers. Serie AD 2004-23, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
- Rubio, Santiago J. & Ulph, Alistair, 2007.
"An infinite-horizon model of dynamic membership of international environmental agreements,"
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- Rubio, S. J. & Ulph, A., 2002. "An infinite-horizon model of dynamic membership of international environmental agreements," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 210, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
- Santiago Rubio & Alistair Ulph, 2003. "An Infinite-Horizon Model of Dynamic Membership of International Environmental Agreements," Working Papers 2003.57, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Calvo, Emilio & Rubio, Santiago J., 2013.
"Dynamic Models of International Environmental Agreements: A Differential Game Approach,"
International Review of Environmental and Resource Economics,
now publishers, vol. 6(4), pages 289-339, April.
- Emilio Calvo & Santiago J. Rubio, 2012. "Dynamic Models of International Environmental Agreements: A Differential Game Approach," Discussion Papers in Economic Behaviour 0112, University of Valencia, ERI-CES.
- Peter Egger & Christoph Jeßberger & Mario Larch, 2011. "Trade and investment liberalization as determinants of multilateral environmental agreement membership," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 18(6), pages 605-633, December.
- Olivier Bos & Béatrice Roussillon & Paul Schweinzer, 2016. "Agreeing on Efficient Emissions Reduction," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 118(4), pages 785-815, October.
- Benchekroun, H. & Ray Chaudhuri, A., 2008. "Collusion Inducing Taxation of a Polluting Oligopoly," Discussion Paper 2008-80, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
More about this item
KeywordsInternational Environmental Agreements; Non-Cooperative Dynamic Game; Coalition Stability;
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- Q53 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Air Pollution; Water Pollution; Noise; Hazardous Waste; Solid Waste; Recycling
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-08-06 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENE-2008-08-06 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-ENV-2008-08-06 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2008-08-06 (Game Theory)
- NEP-REG-2008-08-06 (Regulation)
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