A note on cooperative versus non-cooperative strategies in international pollution control
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- Wirl Franz, 1994. "Pigouvian Taxation of Energy for Flow and Stock Externalities and Strategic, Noncompetitive Energy Pricing," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 1-18, January.
- Dockner Engelbert J. & Van Long Ngo, 1993. "International Pollution Control: Cooperative versus Noncooperative Strategies," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 13-29, July.
- repec:cup:cbooks:9780521637329 is not listed on IDEAS
- Santiago Rubio & Begoña Casino, 2003. "Strategic Behavior and Efficiency in the Common Property Extraction of Groundwater," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 26(1), pages 73-87, September.
- Wirl, Franz & Dockner, Engelbert, 1995. "Leviathan governments and carbon taxes: Costs and potential benefits," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(6), pages 1215-1236, June.
- Jun-ichi Itaya & Koji Shimomura, 1999.
"A Dynamic Conjectural Variations Model in the Private Provision of Public Goods: a Differential Game Approach,"
Discussion Paper Series
104, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University.
- Itaya, Jun-ichi & Shimomura, Koji, 2001. "A dynamic conjectural variations model in the private provision of public goods: a differential game approach," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 153-172, July.
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