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Transboundary Pollution Abatement: The Impact of Unilateral Commitment in Differential Games

Author

Listed:
  • Luisito Bertinelli

    () (CREA, Université de Luxembourg)

  • Amer Tabakovic

    () (CREA, Université de Luxembourg)

  • Luca Marchiori

    () (Central Bank of Luxembourg)

  • Benteng Zou

    () (CREA, Université de Luxembourg)

Abstract

The present study explores the strategic interactions of countries setting pollution abatement policies in a dynamic two-player game. To reach a common target of environmental quality, countries can choose to commit to a stream of pollution abate- ment right from the beginning of the game or decide upon abatement at each moment in time. Most of the literature studies homogenous strategies, where no country or all countries commit to a (same) predefined policy. The main novelty of this paper resides in the introduction of heterogeneous strategies, where only one country commits to a specific abatement policy and which is actually the kind of strategic behavior currently observed among large pollution nations. We find that the pollution level can be lower under heterogeneous than under homogenous strategies. A stringent environmental quality target will induce the committed player to produce an abatement effort that more than compensates the free-riding attitude of the non-committed player.

Suggested Citation

  • Luisito Bertinelli & Amer Tabakovic & Luca Marchiori & Benteng Zou, 2015. "Transboundary Pollution Abatement: The Impact of Unilateral Commitment in Differential Games," CREA Discussion Paper Series 15-02, Center for Research in Economic Analysis, University of Luxembourg.
  • Handle: RePEc:luc:wpaper:15-02
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Heterogeneous strategies; differential games; transboundary pollution; abatement.;

    JEL classification:

    • Q55 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Technological Innovation
    • C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
    • Q59 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Other

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