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The Global Warming Game - Simulations of a CO2 Reduction Agreement

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  • Fankhauser, S.
  • Kverndokk, S.

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  • Fankhauser, S. & Kverndokk, S., 1992. "The Global Warming Game - Simulations of a CO2 Reduction Agreement," Memorandum 1992_013, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:hhs:osloec:1992_013
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    Cited by:

    1. Maryse Labriet & Richard Loulou, 2008. "How Crucial is Cooperation in Mitigating World Climate? Analysis with World-MARKAL," Computational Management Science, Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 67-94, February.
    2. Luisito Bertinelli & Amer Tabakovic & Luca Marchiori & Benteng Zou, 2015. "Transboundary Pollution Abatement: The Impact of Unilateral Commitment in Differential Games," DEM Discussion Paper Series 15-02, Department of Economics at the University of Luxembourg.
    3. Fan, Qiufang & Liu, Jintao & Zhang, Tao & Liu, Haomin, 2022. "An Evaluation of the Efficiency of China’s green investment in the “Belt and Road” countries," Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 496-511.
    4. Wolfgang Buchholz & Kai Konrad, 1994. "Global environmental problems and the strategic choice of technology," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 60(3), pages 299-321, October.
    5. Gjerde, Jon & Grepperud, Sverre & Kverndokk, Snorre, 1999. "Optimal climate policy under the possibility of a catastrophe," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(3-4), pages 289-317, August.
    6. Finus, Michael & Tjotta, Sigve, 2003. "The Oslo Protocol on sulfur reduction: the great leap forward?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(9-10), pages 2031-2048, September.
    7. Carlos Ciscar, Juan & Soria, Antonio, 2000. "Economic convergence and climate policy," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 28(11), pages 749-761, September.
    8. Petrakis, Emmanuel & Xepapadeas, Anastasios, 1996. "Environmental consciousness and moral hazard in international agreements to protect the environment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 95-110, April.
    9. Houda Haffoudhi, 2005. "Political-support lobbies responses to international environmental agreements," Post-Print halshs-00195593, HAL.
    10. Finus, Michael & Rundshagen, Bianca, 1998. "Toward a Positive Theory of Coalition Formation and Endogenous Instrumental Choice in Global Pollution Control," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 96(1-2), pages 145-186, July.
    11. Alfred Endres & Michael Finus, 2002. "Quotas May Beat Taxes in a Global Emission Game," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 9(6), pages 687-707, November.
    12. Robert Shum, 2014. "China, the United States, bargaining, and climate change," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 83-100, March.
    13. Anastasios Xepapadeas, 1998. "Policy Adoption Rules and Global Warming," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 11(3), pages 635-646, April.
    14. Houda Haffoudhi, 2005. "Political-support lobbies responses to international environmental agreements," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques j05053, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
    15. Snorre Kverndokk & Lars Lindholt & Knut Einar Rosendahl, 2000. "Stabilization of CO2 concentrations: mitigation scenarios using the Petro model," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 3(2), pages 195-224, June.
    16. Michael Finus & Bianca Rundshagen, 1998. "Renegotiation–Proof Equilibria in a Global Emission Game When Players Are Impatient," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 12(3), pages 275-306, October.

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