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How Crucial is Cooperation in Mitigating World Climate? Analysis with World-MARKAL

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  • Maryse Labriet

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  • Richard Loulou
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10287-007-0041-4
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    Article provided by Springer in its journal Computational Management Science.

    Volume (Year): 5 (2008)
    Issue (Month): 1 (February)
    Pages: 67-94

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    Handle: RePEc:spr:comgts:v:5:y:2008:i:1:p:67-94
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.springer.com

    Order Information: Web: http://www.springer.com/business+%26+management/operations+research/journal/10287/PS2

    Keywords: Climate change; Technico-economic modelling; MARKAL; Energy; Game Theory; World cooperation; Burden-sharing;

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    1. Henry Tulkens & Parkash Chander, 1997. "The Core of an Economy with Multilateral Environmental Externalities," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 26(3), pages 379-401.
    2. CHANDER, Parkash & TULKENS, Henry, . "Theoretical foundations of negotiations and cost sharing in transfrontier pollution problems," CORE Discussion Papers RP 983, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    3. Michael Finus & Ekko van Ierland, 2003. "Stability of Climate Coalitions in a Cartel Formation Game," Working Papers 2003.61, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    4. Fankhauser, S. & Kverndokk, S., 1992. "The Global Warming Game - Simulations of a CO2 Reduction Agreement," Memorandum 13/1992, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
    5. Germain, Marc & Toint, Philippe L. & Tulkens, Henry, 1999. "Transferts financiers et optimum coopératif international en matière de pollutions-stocks," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 75(1), pages 427-446, mars-juin.
    6. Hackl, Franz & Pruckner, Gerald J., 2003. "How global is the solution to global warming?," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 93-117, January.
    7. Micheal Finus, 2004. "International Cooperation to Resolve International Pollution Problems," Working Papers 2004.41, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    8. de Zeeuw, A.J. & van der Ploeg, F., 1987. "Difference games and policy evaluation : A conceptual framework," Research Memorandum FEW 268, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    9. Sandler,Todd, 1997. "Global Challenges," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521587495.
    10. Elin Berg & Snorre Kverndokk & Knut Einar Rosendahl, 1996. "Market Power, International CO2 Taxation and Petroleum Wealth," Discussion Papers 170, Statistics Norway, Research Department.
    11. Tol, Richard S. J., 2001. "Equitable cost-benefit analysis of climate change policies," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 71-85, January.
    12. Johan Eyckmans, 2001. "On the farsighted stability of the Kyoto Protocol," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0103, KU Leuven, Department of Economics - Research Group Energy, Transport and Environment.
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    Cited by:

    1. Frédéric Babonneau & Alain Haurie & Marc Vielle, 2013. "A robust meta-game for climate negotiations," Computational Management Science, Springer, vol. 10(4), pages 299-329, December.

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