Renegotiation–Proof Equilibria in a Global Emission Game When Players Are Impatient
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- Geir Asheim & Bjart Holtsmark, 2009. "Renegotiation-Proof Climate Agreements with Full Participation: Conditions for Pareto-Efficiency," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 43(4), pages 519-533, August.
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- Dritan Osmani & Richard Tol, 2010. "The Case of two Self-Enforcing International Agreements for Environmental Protection with Asymmetric Countries," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 36(2), pages 93-119, August.
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Keywordsinstrumental choice; international environmental agreements; renegotiation-proof contracts;
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