The biodiversity supergame
This paper considers the ability of developed countries to sustain a cooperative agreement to compensate developing countries for the “incremental costs” of biodiversity conservation. It is shown that, depending on certain parameter values and the model specification, such an agreement could only codify the non-cooperative outcome or achieve the full cooperative outcome where global net benefits are maximized. However, where the agreement can sustain the full cooperative outcome, net benefits will be only slightly larger than in the noncooperative outcome. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1994
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Volume (Year): 4 (1994)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Barrett, Scott, 1992. "Economic growth and environmental preservation," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 289-300, November.
- Farrell, Joseph & Maskin, Eric, 1987.
"Renegotiation in Repeated Games,"
Department of Economics, Working Paper Series
qt9wv3h5jb, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Shapley, Lloyd S & Shubik, Martin, 1969. "On the Core of an Economic System with Externalities," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 59(4), pages 678-684, Part I Se.
- Solow Andrew & Polasky Stephen & Broadus James, 1993. "On the Measurement of Biological Diversity," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 60-68, January.
- Barrett, Scott, 1990. "The Problem of Global Environmental Protection," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(1), pages 68-79, Spring.
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