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Global warming as an asymmetric public bad

Author

Listed:
  • Louis-Gaëtan Giraudet

    (CIRED, Ecole des PontsParisTech)

  • Céline Guivarch

    (CIRED)

Abstract

We extend the canonical dynamic game of global warming to capture three stylized facts: (i) while most countries are expected to suffer damages, some might enjoy short-term benefits; (ii) countries’ exposure to impacts bears little relation to their mitigation capabilities; (iii) some adaptation technologies, such as air conditioning, may exacerbate warming. These sources of asymmetry add free driving to the classical free riding problem. This opens up possibilities for excessive mitigation in a non-cooperative regime, even though damages outweigh benefits. Moreover, it restricts the possibilities of Pareto improvements without transfers. Finally, it can provide a rationale for differentiating Pigouvian prices across countries.

Suggested Citation

  • Louis-Gaëtan Giraudet & Céline Guivarch, 2016. "Global warming as an asymmetric public bad," Working Papers 2016.26, FAERE - French Association of Environmental and Resource Economists.
  • Handle: RePEc:fae:wpaper:2016.26
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    File URL: http://faere.fr/pub/WorkingPapers/Giraudet_Guivarch_FAERE_WP2016.26.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Louis-Gaëtan Giraudet & Céline Guivarch, 2018. "Asymmetric impacts and over-provision of public goods," CIRED Working Papers hal-01960318, HAL.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Differential game; Global warming; Public goods; Mitigation; Adaptation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming

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