Co-operation and Unilateral Commitment inthe Presence of Global EnvironmentalProblems
This paper focuses on the link between group co-operation and unilateral commitment of some countries in the presence of global environmental problems. We show that in case of a failure of negotiation, some countries can decide to commit unilaterally and reduce their emissions. we call this behaviour precautionary commitment.Absence of international agreement does not mean global defection from the environmental issue. we also show that the emergence of a non-co-ordinated global co-operation can result from a strategic actionfrom the members of the coalition. The insiders of the coalition create an incentive for the non-members to reduce without co-ordinating their emissions.
|Date of creation:||2001|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published, Environmental and Resource Economics, 2001, 20, 3, 225-239|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00009889/en/|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/|
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Hoel, M., 1989.
"Global Environmental Problems: The Effects Of Unilateral Actions Taken By One Country,"
11/1989, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
- Hoel, Michael, 1991. "Global environmental problems: The effects of unilateral actions taken by one country," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 55-70, January.
- Henk Folmer & Pierre Mouche & Shannon Ragland, 1993. "Interconnected games and international environmental problems," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 3(4), pages 313-335, August.
- Barrett, Scott, 1997. "The strategy of trade sanctions in international environmental agreements," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(4), pages 345-361, November.
- Carraro, Carlo & Siniscalco, Domenico, 1992. "The international dimension of environmental policy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 36(2-3), pages 379-387, April.
- Barrett, Scott, 1994. "Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(0), pages 878-94, Supplemen.
- d'ASPREMONT, Claude & JACQUEMIN, Alexis & GABSZEWICZ, Jean J. & WEYMARK, John A., .
"On the stability of collusive price leadership,"
CORE Discussion Papers RP
-522, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Kaitala, Veijo & Pohjola, Matti & Tahvonen, Olli, 1992. " An Economic Analysis of Transboundary Air Pollution between Finland and the Former Soviet Union," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 94(3), pages 409-24.
- Rotillon, Gilles & Tazdait, Tarik & Zeghni, Sylvain, 1996. "Bilateral or multilateral bargaining in the face of global environmental change?," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 177-187, August.
- Donsimoni, Marie-Paule & Economides, Nicholas S & Polemarchakis, Herakles M, 1986. "Stable Cartels," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 27(2), pages 317-27, June.
- Carraro, Carlo & Siniscalco, Domenico, 1991.
"Strategies for the International Protection of the Environment,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
568, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Carraro, Carlo & Siniscalco, Domenico, 1993. "Strategies for the international protection of the environment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 309-328, October.
- Gilles Rotillon & Tarik Tazdaït, 1996. "International bargaining in the presence of global environmental change," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 8(3), pages 293-314, October.
- CHANDER, Parkash & TULKENS, Henry, .
"Theoretical foundations of negotiations and cost sharing in transfrontier pollution problems,"
CORE Discussion Papers RP
-983, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Chander, Parkash & Tulkens, Henry, 1992. "Theoretical foundations of negotiations and cost sharing in transfrontier pollution problems," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 36(2-3), pages 388-399, April.
- Veijo Kaitala & Matti Pohjola & Olli Tahvonen, 1992.
"Transboundary air pollution and soil acidification: A dynamic analysis of an acid rain game between Finland and the USSR,"
Environmental & Resource Economics,
European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 2(2), pages 161-181, March.
- Kaitala, Veijo & Pohjola, Matti & Tahvonen, Olli, 1990. "Transboundary Air Pollution and Soil Acidification: A Dynamic Analysis of an Acid Rain Game between Finland and the USSR," Discussion Papers 344, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy.
- Chen, Zhiqi, 1997. "Negotiating an Agreement on Global Warming: A Theoretical Analysis," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 170-188, February.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00009889. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (CCSD)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.