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Unilateral Actions the Case of International Environmental Problems

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  • Urs Steiner Brandt

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Abstract

When abatement costs are uncertain, but correlated, and a country becomes pri-vately informed that costs are low, then unilateral actions serve as a signalling devise to reveal low costs and unilateral actions have the potential to trigger positive responses abroad. However, the country engaging in unilateral actions is the one with the highest expectation about the other countries’ reactions, and it might suffer from an effect like the winners curse.

Suggested Citation

  • Urs Steiner Brandt, 2003. "Unilateral Actions the Case of International Environmental Problems," Working Papers 40/03, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Sociology, Environmental and Business Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:sdk:wpaper:40
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bac, Mehmet, 1996. "Incomplete Information and Incentives to Free Ride on International Environmental Resources," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 301-315, May.
    2. Hoel, Michael, 1991. "Global environmental problems: The effects of unilateral actions taken by one country," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 55-70, January.
    3. Jean-Christophe Pereau & Tarik Tazdait, 2001. "Co-operation and Unilateral Commitment in the Presence of Global Environmental Problems," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 20(3), pages 225-239, November.
    4. Barrett, Scott, 1994. "Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(0), pages 878-894, Supplemen.
    5. Sandler,Todd, 1997. "Global Challenges," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521587495, March.
    6. Hermalin, Benjamin E, 1998. "Toward an Economic Theory of Leadership: Leading by Example," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(5), pages 1188-1206, December.
    7. Michael R. Ransom & Gordon B. Dahl, 1999. "Does Where You Stand Depend on Where You Sit? Tithing Donations and Self-Serving Beliefs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(4), pages 703-727, September.
    8. Potters, Jan & Sloof, Randolph, 1996. "Interest groups: A survey of empirical models that try to assess their influence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 403-442, November.
    9. Matthew Rabin, 1998. "Psychology and Economics," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 36(1), pages 11-46, March.
    10. Urs Steiner Brandt, 2002. "Actions Prior to Entering an International Environmental Agreement," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 158(4), pages 695-695, December.
    11. Anke Kessler, 1998. "The Value of Ignorance," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(2), pages 339-354, Summer.
    12. Hoel, Michael, 1997. "Coordination of environmental policy for transboundary environmental problems?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 199-224, November.
    13. Kambhu, John, 1988. "Unilateral disclosure of private information by a regulated firm," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 57-82, July.
    14. Barrett, Scott, 1998. "Political Economy of the Kyoto Protocol," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 14(4), pages 20-39, Winter.
    15. Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Michael Jakob & Kai Lessmann, 2012. "Signaling in international environmental agreements: the case of early and delayed action," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 12(4), pages 309-325, November.
    2. Konrad, Kai A. & Thum, Marcel, 2011. "Unilateral action and negotiations about climate policy," Discussion Papers, Research Professorship & Project "The Future of Fiscal Federalism" SP II 2011-109, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
    3. Carsten Helm & Franz Wirl, 2016. "Climate Policies with Private Information: The Case for Unilateral Action," Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, University of Chicago Press, vol. 3(4), pages 893-916.
    4. Eskeland, Gunnar S., 2013. "Leadership in Climate Policy: Is there a case for Early Unilateral Unconditional Emission Reductions?," Discussion Papers 2013/6, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science.
    5. Ana Espínola-Arredondo & Félix Muñoz-García, 2011. "Free-riding in international environmental agreements: A signaling approach to non-enforceable treaties," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 23(1), pages 111-134, January.
    6. Achim Voß, 2015. "How Disagreement About Social Costs Leads to Inefficient Energy-Productivity Investment," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 60(4), pages 521-548, April.
    7. Alejandro Caparrós, 2016. "Bargaining and International Environmental Agreements," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 65(1), pages 5-31, September.
    8. Urs Steiner Brandt & Gert Tinggaard Svendsen, 2004. "Fighting Windmills: The Coalition of Industrialists and Environmentalists in the Climate Change Issue," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 4(4), pages 327-337, December.
    9. Karoline Steinbacher & Michael Pahle, 2016. "Leadership and the Energiewende: German Leadership by Diffusion," Global Environmental Politics, MIT Press, vol. 16(4), pages 70-89, November.
    10. Wolfgang Buchholz & Michael Eichenseer, 2017. "Advantageous Leadership in Public Good Provision: The Case of an Endogenous Contribution Technology," CESifo Working Paper Series 6352, CESifo Group Munich.
    11. Gregor Schwerhoff, 2013. "Leadership and International Climate Cooperation," Working Papers 2013.97, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    12. repec:kap:enreec:v:67:y:2017:i:3:d:10.1007_s10640-016-9997-2 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Buchholz, Wolfgang & Eichenseer, Michael, 2017. "Advantageous Leadership in Public Good Provision: The Case of an Endogenous Contribution Technology," Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking 168153, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    14. Köke, Sonja & Lange, Andreas, 2013. "Negotiating Environmental Agreements under Ratification Uncertainty," Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79952, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    15. Urs Steiner Brandt & Gert Tinggaard Svendsen, 2003. "Fighting windmills? EU industrial interests and global climate negotiations," Working Papers 37/03, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Sociology, Environmental and Business Economics.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    International environmental problems; unilateral reductions; signal-ling costs;

    JEL classification:

    • Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy
    • H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty

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