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Unilateral Actions the Case of International Environmental Problems

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  • Urs Steiner Brandt

Abstract

When abatement costs are uncertain, but correlated, and a country becomes pri-vately informed that costs are low, then unilateral actions serve as a signalling devise to reveal low costs and unilateral actions have the potential to trigger positive responses abroad. However, the country engaging in unilateral actions is the one with the highest expectation about the other countries’ reactions, and it might suffer from an effect like the winners curse.

Suggested Citation

  • Urs Steiner Brandt, 2003. "Unilateral Actions the Case of International Environmental Problems," Working Papers 40/03, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Sociology, Environmental and Business Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:sdk:wpaper:40
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Michael Jakob & Kai Lessmann, 2012. "Signaling in international environmental agreements: the case of early and delayed action," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 12(4), pages 309-325, November.
    2. Jakob, Michael, 2021. "Climate policy and international trade – A critical appraisal of the literature," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 156(C).
    3. Fuhai Hong, 2014. "Technology transfer with transboundary pollution: A signalling approach," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 47(3), pages 953-980, August.
    4. Carsten Helm & Franz Wirl, 2016. "Climate Policies with Private Information: The Case for Unilateral Action," Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, University of Chicago Press, vol. 3(4), pages 893-916.
    5. Achim Voß, 2015. "How Disagreement About Social Costs Leads to Inefficient Energy-Productivity Investment," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 60(4), pages 521-548, April.
    6. Alejandro Caparrós, 2016. "Bargaining and International Environmental Agreements," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 65(1), pages 5-31, September.
    7. D. Rajagopal, 2017. "A synthesis of unilateral approaches to mitigating emissions leakage under incomplete policies," Climate Policy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 17(5), pages 573-590, July.
    8. Urs Steiner Brandt & Gert Tinggaard Svendsen, 2004. "Fighting Windmills: The Coalition of Industrialists and Environmentalists in the Climate Change Issue," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 4(4), pages 327-337, December.
    9. Fuhai Hong & Yu Pang, 2024. "Mitigation and adaptation: an informational perspective," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 141(1), pages 57-92, January.
    10. Ana Espínola-Arredondo & Félix Muñoz-García, 2011. "Free-riding in international environmental agreements: A signaling approach to non-enforceable treaties," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 23(1), pages 111-134, January.
    11. Schwerhoff, Gregor, 2013. "Leadership and International Climate Cooperation," Climate Change and Sustainable Development 162380, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
    12. Wolfgang Buchholz & Todd Sandler, 2017. "Successful Leadership in Global Public Good Provision: Incorporating Behavioural Approaches," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 67(3), pages 591-607, July.
    13. Botao Qin & Thorsten Janus, 2019. "Social norms and the effect of unilateral actions on climate change," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 39(1), pages 372-379.
    14. Brandt, Urs Steiner & Svendsen, Gert Tinggaard, 2022. "Is the annual UNFCCC COP the only game in town?," Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Elsevier, vol. 183(C).
    15. Wolfgang Buchholz & Michael Eichenseer, 2019. "Advantageous leadership in public good provision: the case of an endogenous contribution technology," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 126(1), pages 1-17, January.
    16. Köke, Sonja & Lange, Andreas, 2013. "Negotiating Environmental Agreements under Ratification Uncertainty," VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79952, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    17. Urs Steiner Brandt & Gert Tinggaard Svendsen, 2023. "Technology Diffusion and Climate Action: A Leader–Follower Model," SN Operations Research Forum, Springer, vol. 4(4), pages 1-19, December.
    18. Torben K. Mideksa, 2021. "Leadership and Climate Policy," CESifo Working Paper Series 9054, CESifo.
    19. Konrad, Kai A. & Thum, Marcel, 2011. "Unilateral action and negotiations about climate policy," Discussion Papers, Research Professorship & Project "The Future of Fiscal Federalism" SP II 2011-109, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    20. Eskeland, Gunnar S., 2013. "Leadership in Climate Policy: Is there a case for Early Unilateral Unconditional Emission Reductions?," Discussion Papers 2013/6, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science.
    21. Gregor Schwerhoff & Ulrike Kornek & Kai Lessmann & Michael Pahle, 2018. "Leadership In Climate Change Mitigation: Consequences And Incentives," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(2), pages 491-517, April.
    22. Gregor Schwerhoff, 2016. "The economics of leadership in climate change mitigation," Climate Policy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 16(2), pages 196-214, March.
    23. Karoline Steinbacher & Michael Pahle, 2016. "Leadership and the Energiewende: German Leadership by Diffusion," Global Environmental Politics, MIT Press, vol. 16(4), pages 70-89, November.
    24. Urs Steiner Brandt & Gert Tinggaard Svendsen, 2003. "Fighting windmills? EU industrial interests and global climate negotiations," Working Papers 37/03, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Sociology, Environmental and Business Economics.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    International environmental problems; unilateral reductions; signal-ling costs;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy
    • H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty

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