Free-riding in International Environmental Agreements: A Signaling Approach to Non-Enforceable Treaties
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- Ana Espínola-Arredondo & Félix Muñoz-García, 2011. "Free-riding in international environmental agreements: A signaling approach to non-enforceable treaties," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 23(1), pages 111-134, January.
- Ana Espinola-Arredondo & Felix Munoz-Garcia, 2009. "Free-riding in International Environmental Agreements: A Signaling Approach to Non-Enforceable Treaties," Working Papers 2009-08, School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University.
References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Bodas Freitas, Isabel Maria & Dantas, Eva & Iizuka, Michiko, 2012.
"The Kyoto mechanisms and the diffusion of renewable energy technologies in the BRICS,"
Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 118-128.
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- Carsten Helm & Franz Wirl, 2016.
"Climate Policies with Private Information: The Case for Unilateral Action,"
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- Carsten Helm & Franz Wirl, 2015. "Climate policies with private information: The case for unilateral action," Working Papers V-378-15, University of Oldenburg, Department of Economics, revised Apr 2015.
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- Gregor Schwerhoff & Ulrike Kornek & Kai Lessmann & Michael Pahle, 2018. "Leadership In Climate Change Mitigation: Consequences And Incentives," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(2), pages 491-517, April.
- Ana Espinola-Arredondo & Felix Munoz-Garcia, 2010. "Keeping Negotiations in the Dark: Environmental Agreements under Incomplete Information," Working Papers 2010-20, School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University.
More about this item
KeywordsSignaling games; environmental agreements; nonbinding negotiations; noncompliance cost;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
- Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-CTA-2009-10-24 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-ENV-2009-10-24 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2009-10-24 (Game Theory)
- NEP-REG-2009-10-24 (Regulation)
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