Self-Enforcing Trade Agreements and Private Information
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Mostafa Beshkar & Jee-Hyeong Park, 2017. "Dispute Settlement with Second-Order Uncertainty: The Case of International Trade Disputes," Caepr Working Papers 2017-010 Classification-K, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Economics Department, Indiana University Bloomington.
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"Optimal International Agreement and Treatment of Domestic Subsidy,"
Working Papers
01-2011, Singapore Management University, School of Economics.
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"Preferential Trade Agreements and the Labor Market,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
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- Emanuel Ornelas, 2012. "Preferential Trade Agreements and the Labor Market," CEP Discussion Papers dp1117, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
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Journal of Economic Literature,
American Economic Association, vol. 54(4), pages 1125-1231, December.
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- Lee, Gea M., 2016. "Optimal international agreement and restriction on domestic efficiency," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 138-155.
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- Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 2016. "The Design of Trade Agreements," NBER Working Papers 22087, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Ana Espinola-Arredondo & Felix Munoz-Garcia, "undated". "When does Disinformation Promote Successful Treaties," Working Papers 2011-11, School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-ALL-2009-04-05 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2009-04-05 (Contract Theory & Applications)
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