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When does Disinformation Promote Successful Treaties


  • Ana Espinola-Arredondo
  • Felix Munoz-Garcia

    () (School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University)


This paper analyzes the negotiation of a non-binding treaty where agents are uninformed about each others?ability to comply with the terms of the agreement. We show that the presence of incomplete information allows the treaty to become successful under larger set of parameter conditions than under complete information. The paper also examines the welfare properties of our equilibrium results, showing a welfare improvement relative to complete information under certain conditions. Finally, we extend our analysis to settings where countries?types are correlated, ?nding that the equilibrium outcome where information is conveyed can be supported under larger conditions, whereas equilibria where information is concealed are sustained under a more restrictive set of parameter values.

Suggested Citation

  • Ana Espinola-Arredondo & Felix Munoz-Garcia, "undated". "When does Disinformation Promote Successful Treaties," Working Papers 2011-11, School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University.
  • Handle: RePEc:wsu:wpaper:munoz-11

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    File Function: First version, 2011
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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Kyle Bagwell, 2009. "Self-Enforcing Trade Agreements and Private Information," NBER Working Papers 14812, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Ulph, Alistair (ed.), 2001. "Environmental Policy, International Agreements, and International Trade," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198293293.
    3. Martin, Alberto & Vergote, Wouter, 2008. "On the role of retaliation in trade agreements," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 61-77, September.
    4. Downs, George W. & Rocke, David M. & Barsoom, Peter N., 1996. "Is the good news about compliance good news about cooperation?," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 50(03), pages 379-406, June.
    5. Whalley, John, 1991. "The Interface between Environmental and Trade Policies," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 101(405), pages 180-189, March.
    6. repec:cup:apsrev:v:99:y:2005:i:04:p:549-565_05 is not listed on IDEAS
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item


    Signaling games; Information transmission; non-binding negotiations; Correlated types;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy


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