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Institutional Flexibility in the Design of Multilateral Environmental Agreements

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  • Christopher Marcoux

    (Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, USA)

Abstract

Current research on international treaties suggests that flexibility provisions can facilitate the diplomatic resolution of international environmental problems.This article advances understanding of this process by describing a typology of flexibility mechanisms found in multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs), and by arguing that negotiators strategically select different types of institutional flexibility mechanisms in response to different problems. Multivariate analysis of a new dataset of MEAs indicates that a wider variety of factors influence provision of institutional flexibility than many current studies consider. Specifically, power asymmetry among contracting states is shown to be the most important predictor of flexibility provisions in MEAs.

Suggested Citation

  • Christopher Marcoux, 2009. "Institutional Flexibility in the Design of Multilateral Environmental Agreements," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 26(2), pages 209-228, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:compsc:v:26:y:2009:i:2:p:209-228
    DOI: 10.1177/0738894208101130
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Todd Allee & Manfred Elsig, 2016. "Why do some international institutions contain strong dispute settlement provisions? New evidence from preferential trade agreements," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 89-120, March.

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