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Early birds: Special interests and the strategic logic of international cooperation

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  • Johannes Urpelainen

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    No abstract is available for this item.

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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11558-010-9099-9
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    Article provided by Springer in its journal The Review of International Organizations.

    Volume (Year): 6 (2011)
    Issue (Month): 2 (July)
    Pages: 113-140

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    Handle: RePEc:spr:revint:v:6:y:2011:i:2:p:113-140
    DOI: 10.1007/s11558-010-9099-9
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.springer.com

    Order Information: Web: http://www.springer.com/business/sociology/journal/11558

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    1. Mertha, Andrew & Pahre, Robert, 2005. "Patently Misleading: Partial Implementation and Bargaining Leverage in Sino-American Negotiations on Intellectual Property Rights," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 59(03), pages 695-729, July.
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    18. Kucik, Jeffrey & Reinhardt, Eric, 2008. "Does Flexibility Promote Cooperation? An Application to the Global Trade Regime," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 62(03), pages 477-505, July.
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    20. repec:cup:apsrev:v:95:y:2001:i:03:p:649-661_00 is not listed on IDEAS
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    22. Mitchell, Ronald B., 1994. "Regime design matters: intentional oil pollution and treaty compliance," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 48(03), pages 425-458, June.
    23. Lohmann, Susanne & O'Halloran, Sharyn, 1994. "Divided government and U.S. trade policy: theory and evidence," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 48(04), pages 595-632, September.
    24. Downs, George W. & Rocke, David M. & Barsoom, Peter N., 1996. "Is the good news about compliance good news about cooperation?," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 50(03), pages 379-406, June.
    25. Robert W. Staiger & Kyle Bagwell, 1999. "An Economic Theory of GATT," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 215-248, March.
    26. Guisinger, Alexandra, 2009. "Determining Trade Policy: Do Voters Hold Politicians Accountable?," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 63(03), pages 533-557, July.
    27. Abbott, Kenneth W. & Snidal, Duncan, 2000. "Hard and Soft Law in International Governance," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 54(03), pages 421-456, June.
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    29. Putnam, Robert D., 1988. "Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 42(03), pages 427-460, June.
    30. Aidt, Toke S., 1998. "Political internalization of economic externalities and environmental policy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 1-16, July.
    31. Koremenos, Barbara & Lipson, Charles & Snidal, Duncan, 2001. "The Rational Design of International Institutions," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 55(04), pages 761-799, September.
    32. Gilligan, Michael J., 2004. "Is There a Broader-Deeper Trade-off in International Multilateral Agreements?," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 58(03), pages 459-484, July.
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    35. Dai, Xinyuan, 2005. "Why Comply? The Domestic Constituency Mechanism," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 59(02), pages 363-398, April.
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