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Explaining Inefficient Policy Instruments

  • de Gorter, Harry

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File URL: http://purl.umn.edu/48638
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Paper provided by World Bank in its series Agricultural Distortions Working Paper with number 48638.

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Date of creation: Aug 2008
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Handle: RePEc:ags:wbadwp:48638
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.worldbank.org

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  1. Gary S. Becker & Casey B. Mulligan, 1998. "Deadweight Costs and the Size of Government," NBER Working Papers 6789, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Bovenberg, A.L. & de Mooij, R.A., 1994. "Environmental levies and distortionary taxation," Other publications TiSEM 4b32deaa-ec2f-4de7-b59b-9, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  3. Beard, Nick & Swinbank, Alan, 2001. "Decoupled payments to facilitate CAP reform," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 121-145, April.
  4. William E. Foster & Gordon C. Rausser, 1992. "Price-Distorting Compensation Serving the Consumer and Taxpayer Interest," Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) Publications 90-gatt15, Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) at Iowa State University.
  5. Avinash K. Dixit, 1998. "The Making of Economic Policy: A Transaction Cost Politics Perspective," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262540983, June.
  6. Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 1998. "Sources of Inefficiency in a Representative Democracy: A Dynamic Analysis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 139-56, March.
  7. Beghin, John C. & Karp, Larry S., 1991. "Estimation of price policies in Senegal An empirical test of cooperative game theory," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 49-67, January.
  8. Wittman, Donald, 1989. "Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(6), pages 1395-1424, December.
  9. Kahneman, Daniel & Tversky, Amos, 1979. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(2), pages 263-91, March.
  10. Swinnen, Johan F.M. & de Gorter, Harry, 1995. "Endogenous Commodity Policies and the Social Benefits from Public Research Expenditures," Working Papers 128002, Cornell University, Department of Applied Economics and Management.
  11. Ruben Segura-Cayuela, 2006. "Inefficient Policies, Inefficient Institutions and Trade," 2006 Meeting Papers 502, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  12. Alberto Alesina & Dani Rodrik, 1991. "Distributive Politics and Economic Growth," NBER Working Papers 3668, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  13. Gary S. Becker, 1984. "Public Policies, Pressure Groups, and Dead Weight Costs," University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State 35, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State.
  14. H. Guyomard & L. P. Mahé & K. J. Munk & T. L. Roe, 1993. "Agriculture In The Uruguay Round: Ambitions And Realities," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(2), pages 245-263.
  15. Bullock, David S, 1995. "Are Government Transfers Efficient? An Alternative Test of the Efficient Redistribution Hypothesis," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(6), pages 1236-74, December.
  16. Paarlberg, Robert, 1997. "Agricultural Policy Reform and the Uruguay Round: Synergistic Linkage in a Two-Level Game?," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 51(03), pages 413-444, June.
  17. Putnam, Robert D., 1988. "Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 42(03), pages 427-460, June.
  18. Anderson, Kym, 1995. "Lobbying Incentives and the Pattern of Protection in Rich and Poor Countries," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 43(2), pages 401-23, January.
  19. Daron Acemoglu, 2002. "Why Not a Political Coase Theorem? Social Conflict, Commitment and Politics," NBER Working Papers 9377, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  20. Alberto Alesina & Dani Rodrik, 1994. "Distributive Politics and Economic Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 109(2), pages 465-490.
  21. Lawrence H. Goulder & Roberton C. Williams III, 2003. "The Substantial Bias from Ignoring General Equilibrium Effects in Estimating Excess Burden, and a Practical Solution," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 111(4), pages 898-927, August.
  22. Ian W.H. Parry, 1999. "Agricultural Policies in the Presence of Distorting Taxes," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 81(1), pages 212-230.
  23. Kathy Baylis & Gordon Rausser, 2001. "Rules, Policy and Rent Seeking: A Cross-border Comparison," Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics/Revue canadienne d'agroeconomie, Canadian Agricultural Economics Society/Societe canadienne d'agroeconomie, vol. 49(4), pages 493-504, December.
  24. Blandford, David & de Gorter, Harry & Harvey, David, 1989. "Farm income support with minimal trade distortions," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 268-273, August.
  25. Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, 2008. "Persistence of Power, Elites, and Institutions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(1), pages 267-93, March.
  26. George J. Stigler, 1971. "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 3-21, Spring.
  27. Joe Dewbre & Jesús Antón & Wyatt Thompton, 2001. "The Transfer Efficiency and Trade Effects of Direct Payments," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 83(5), pages 1204-1214.
  28. Bruce Gardner, 1983. "Efficient Redistribution through Commodity Markets," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 65(2), pages 225-234.
  29. Weingast, Barry R & Marshall, William J, 1988. "The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(1), pages 132-63, February.
  30. Kishore Gawande, 1999. "Trade Barriers as Outcomes from Two-Stage Games: Evidence," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 32(4), pages 1028-1056, August.
  31. Johan F. M. Swinnen & Harry Gorter, 1993. "Why Small Groups And Low Income Sectors Obtain Subsidies: The "Altruistic" Side Of A "Self-Interested" Government," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 5(3), pages 285-293, November.
  32. Browning, Edgar K., 1997. "A neglected welfare cost of monopoly--and most other product market distortions," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 127-144, October.
  33. Patterson, Lee Ann, 1997. "Agricultural policy reform in the European Community: a three-level game analysis," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 51(01), pages 135-165, December.
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