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Explaining Inefficient Policy Instruments

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  • de Gorter, Harry

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  • de Gorter, Harry, 2008. "Explaining Inefficient Policy Instruments," Agricultural Distortions Working Paper 48638, World Bank.
  • Handle: RePEc:ags:wbadwp:48638
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    File URL: http://purl.umn.edu/48638
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Distorted incentives; agricultural and trade policy reforms; national agricultural development; Agricultural and Food Policy; International Relations/Trade; F13; F14; Q17; Q18;

    JEL classification:

    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
    • F14 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Empirical Studies of Trade
    • Q17 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Agriculture in International Trade
    • Q18 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Agricultural Policy; Food Policy

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