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Explaining Inefficient Policy Instruments

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  • de Gorter, Harry

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  • de Gorter, Harry, 2008. "Explaining Inefficient Policy Instruments," Agricultural Distortions Working Paper Series 48638, World Bank.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:wbadwp:48638
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.48638
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