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Trade Barriers as Outcomes from Two-Stage Games: Evidence

Author

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  • Kishore Gawande

Abstract

A substantial theoretical literature on trade policy as equilibrium outcomes from cooperative and non-cooperative games has grown recently, but its implications have rarely been subjected to empirical scrutiny. It not only makes predictions about equilibrium levels of protection, but also positive observations about the choice of trade instruments. In this paper predictions from the two-stage games in Copeland (1990) and Copeland, Tower, and Webb (1989) are empirically investigated using bilateral non-tariff barrier (NTB) data between the United States and nine developed partner countries. This 'first round' of systematic empirical evidence suggests directions for further theoretical work.

Suggested Citation

  • Kishore Gawande, 1999. "Trade Barriers as Outcomes from Two-Stage Games: Evidence," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 32(4), pages 1028-1056, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:32:y:1999:i:4:p:1028-1056
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. de Gorter, Harry, 2008. "Explaining Inefficient Policy Instruments," Agricultural Distortions Working Paper Series 48638, World Bank.
    2. Brian R. Copeland & M. Scott Taylor, 2004. "Trade, Growth, and the Environment," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 42(1), pages 7-71, March.
    3. Emma Aisbett & Magdalene Silberberger, 2021. "Tariff liberalization and product standards: Regulatory chill and race to the bottom?," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 15(3), pages 987-1006, July.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
    • C34 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Truncated and Censored Models; Switching Regression Models

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