Lobbying Incentives and the Pattern of Protection in Rich and Poor Countries
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- Anderson, Kym, 1993. "Lobbying Incentives and the Pattern of Protection in Rich and Poor Countries," CEPR Discussion Papers 789, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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- F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
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