Policy Choice: Theory and Evidence from Commitment via International Trade Agreements
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- Limão, Nuno & Tovar, Patricia, 2011. "Policy choice: Theory and evidence from commitment via international trade agreements," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(2), pages 186-205.
- Nuno Limão & Patricia Tovar, 2009. "Policy Choice: Theory and Evidence from Commitment via International Trade Agreements," NBER Working Papers 14655, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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More about this item
Keywords
bargaining; commitment; Inefficient redistribution; lobbies; non-tariff barrier; PTA; tariff; trade; WTO;JEL classification:
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
- F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
- H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-ALL-2009-02-28 (All new papers)
- NEP-INT-2009-02-28 (International Trade)
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