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A "New Trade" Theory of GATT/WTO Negotiations

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  • Ralph Ossa

Abstract

I suggest a novel theory of GATT/WTO negotiations based on Krugman's "new trade" model. It emphasizes international production relocations and is easy to calibrate to bilateral trade data. Focusing on the major players in recent GATT/WTO negotiations, I find that it implies reasonable noncooperative tariffs as well as moderate gains from GATT/WTO negotiations.

Suggested Citation

  • Ralph Ossa, 2011. "A "New Trade" Theory of GATT/WTO Negotiations," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 119(1), pages 122-152.
  • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/659371
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    JEL classification:

    • F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations

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