Trade Wars and Trade Talks
When governments meet in the international arena, their actions reflect the political situations at home. Previous studies of trade relations have focused on governments that are immune from political pressures and that act as benevolent servants of the public interest. Here the authors introduce domestic politics into the analysis of international economic relations. They study the interactions between national leaders who are concerned with both providing a high standard of living to the general electorate and collecting campaign contributions from special-interest groups. The authors' analysis sheds light on the determinants of the structure of protection in noncooperative and cooperative policy equilibria. Copyright 1995 by University of Chicago Press.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Grossman, G.M. & Helpman, E., 1992.
"Protection for Sale,"
21-92, Tel Aviv.
- Grossman, G.M. & Helpman, E., 1992. "Protection for Sale," Papers 162, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs.
- Grossman, Gene & Helpman, Elhanan, 1993. "Protection for Sale," CEPR Discussion Papers 827, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 1992. "Protection For Sale," NBER Working Papers 4149, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Hillman, Arye L, 1982. "Declining Industries and Political-Support Protectionist Motives," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(5), pages 1180-87, December.
- Van Long, Ngo & Vousden, Neil, 1991. "Protectionist responses and declining industries," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1-2), pages 87-103, February.
- Kuga, Kiyoshi, 1973. "Tariff retaliation and policy equilibrium," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 351-366, November.
- Michael L. Katz, 1991.
"Game-Playing Agents: Unobservable Contracts as Precommitments,"
RAND Journal of Economics,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(3), pages 307-328, Autumn.
- Michael L. Katz., 1991. "Game-Playing Agents: Unobservable Contracts as Precommitments," Economics Working Papers 91-172, University of California at Berkeley.
- Katz, Michael L., 1991. "Game-Playing Agents: Unobservable Contracts as Precommitments," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt79b870w0, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Mayer, Wolfgang, 1981. "Theoretical Considerations on Negotiated Tariff Adjustments," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 33(1), pages 135-53, March.
- Suzanne Tosini & Edward Tower, 1987. "The textile bill of 1985: The determinants of congressional voting patterns," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 54(1), pages 19-25, January.
- Fershtman, Chaim & Judd, Kenneth L, 1987.
"Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 927-40, December.
- Ken Binmore & Ariel Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky, 1986. "The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(2), pages 176-188, Summer.
- Trefler, Daniel, 1993. "Trade Liberalization and the Theory of Endogenous Protection: An Econometric Study of U.S. Import Policy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(1), pages 138-60, February.
- Riedel, James, 1976.
"Tariff concessions in the Kennedy Round and the structure of protection in West Germany: An econometric assessment,"
Kiel Working Papers
41, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
- Riedel, James, 1977. "Tariff concessions in the Kennedy Round and the structure of protection in West Germany : An econometric assessment," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 133-143, May.
- B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, 1986. "Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 101(1), pages 1-31.
- George J. Stigler, 1971. "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 3-21, Spring.
- John Sutton, 1986. "Non-Cooperative Bargaining Theory: An Introduction," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 53(5), pages 709-724.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:103:y:1995:i:4:p:675-708. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Journals Division)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.