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Endogenous Behaviour of the Tariff Rate in a Political Economy

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  • Hom M Pant

    (University of Tasmania)

Abstract

How would the tariff rate in a political economy respond to changes in exogenous environment? To answer this question a bargain-theoretic approach is adopted and a tariff-endogenous general equilibrium model of a small open political economy is derived. A comparative static analysis of the model shows that the bargained tariff rate changes to compensate, at least in part, for the relative loss of the loser arising from changes in the exogenous environment - be it the domestic factor endowment or the international terms of trade

Suggested Citation

  • Hom M Pant, 1996. "Endogenous Behaviour of the Tariff Rate in a Political Economy," International Trade 9609001, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 01 Oct 1996.
  • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpit:9609001
    Note: Type of Document - Word 7.0; prepared on IBM PC ; to print on HP LaserJet4; pages: 29 ; figures: included. Comments welcome!
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    endogenous-tariff; comparative statics; Nash bargaining games; CGE models; political economy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C6 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory

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