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The Political Economy of Trade Policy in China

  • Bin, Sheng

    (Nankai University)

Registered author(s):

    Most of economists, who prefer either the classical trade theory or the latest emerging new trade theory, adhere to the doctrine of free trade. However, the perplexity between the theoretical ideology and ever-lasting protectionism in reality demonstrates that the political decision-making process of trade policy is often less understood or even ignored. Political economy of trade policy, or simply called endogenous tariff theory, may offer a plausible and decent answer to the dilemma from the perspective of income distribution, rather than economic efficiency.

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    File URL: http://openarchive.cbs.dk/handle/10398/6305
    Download Restriction: no

    Paper provided by Copenhagen Business School, Department of Management, Politics & Philosophy in its series Working Papers with number 10/2000.

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    Length: 67 pages
    Date of creation: 01 Aug 2000
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:hhb:cbslpf:2000_010
    Contact details of provider: Postal: Department of Management, Politics and Philosophy, Copenhagen Business School, Blaagaardsgade 23 B, DK-2200 Copenhagen N, Denmark
    Phone: +45 3815 3815
    Web page: http://www.cbs.dk/departments/mpp/Email:


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    1. Giovanni Maggi & Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg, 1999. "Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(5), pages 1135-1155, December.
    2. Lee G. Branstetter & Robert C. Feenstra, 1999. "Trade and Foreign Direct Investment in China: A Political Economy Approach," NBER Working Papers 7100, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Marcelo Olarreaga, 1998. "Tariff Reductions under Foreign Factor Ownership," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 31(4), pages 830-836, November.
    4. Helpman, E., 1995. "Politics and Trade Policy," Papers 30-95, Tel Aviv - the Sackler Institute of Economic Studies.
    5. Rodrik, Dani, 1995. "Political economy of trade policy," Handbook of International Economics, in: G. M. Grossman & K. Rogoff (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 28, pages 1457-1494 Elsevier.
    6. Baldwin, Robert E., 1984. "Trade policies in developed countries," Handbook of International Economics, in: R. W. Jones & P. B. Kenen (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 12, pages 571-619 Elsevier.
    7. Finger, J M & Hall, H Keith & Nelson, Douglas R, 1982. "The Political Economy of Administered Protection," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(3), pages 452-66, June.
    8. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521377003 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Hillman, Arye L, 1982. "Declining Industries and Political-Support Protectionist Motives," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(5), pages 1180-87, December.
    10. Robert C. Feenstra & Jagdish N. Bhagwati, 1982. "Tariff Seeking and the Efficient Tariff," NBER Chapters, in: Import Competition and Response, pages 245-262 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Robert E. Baldwin, 1982. "The Political Economy of Protectionism," NBER Chapters, in: Import Competition and Response, pages 263-292 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Baldwin, Robert E, 1989. "The Political Economy of Trade Policy," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(4), pages 119-35, Fall.
    13. Krueger, Anne O, 1974. "The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 64(3), pages 291-303, June.
    14. Grossman, G.M. & Helpman, E., 1992. "Protection for Sale," Papers 21-92, Tel Aviv.
    15. Yongzheng Yang, 1996. "China's WTO Membership: What's at Stake?," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(6), pages 661-682, November.
    16. Trefler, Daniel, 1993. "Trade Liberalization and the Theory of Endogenous Protection: An Econometric Study of U.S. Import Policy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(1), pages 138-60, February.
    17. Mayer, Wolfgang, 1984. "Endogenous Tariff Formation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(5), pages 970-85, December.
    18. Grether, Jean-Marie & de Melo, Jaime & Olarreaga, Marcelo, 1999. "Who determines Mexican trade policy?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2187, The World Bank.
    19. Staiger, Robert W & Tabellini, Guido, 1987. "Discretionary Trade Policy and Excessive Protection," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 823-37, December.
    20. Bhagwati, Jagdish N, 1982. "Directly Unproductive, Profit-seeking (DUP) Activities," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(5), pages 988-1002, October.
    21. Jeffrey D. Sachs & Wing Thye Woo, 1997. "Understanding China's Economic Performance," NBER Working Papers 5935, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    22. Pincus, J J, 1975. "Pressure Groups and the Pattern of Tariffs," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(4), pages 757-78, August.
    23. Yongzheng Yang & Yiping Huang, 1997. "How Should China Feed Itself?," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(7), pages 913-934, November.
    24. Yoo Jung-ho, 1993. "The Political Economy of Protection Structure in Korea," NBER Chapters, in: Trade and Protectionism, NBER-EASE Volume 2, pages 361-385 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    25. Anne O. Krueger, 1996. "The Political Economy of American Trade Policy," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number krue96-1, October.
    26. Kiichiro Fukasaku & Henri-Bernard Solignac Lecomte, 1996. "Economic Transition and Trade-Policy Reform: Lessons from China," OECD Development Centre Working Papers 112, OECD Publishing.
    27. Tain-Jy Chen & Chi-ming Hou, 1993. "The Political Economy of Trade Protection in the Republic of China on Taiwan," NBER Chapters, in: Trade and Protectionism, NBER-EASE Volume 2, pages 339-359 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    28. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521362474 is not listed on IDEAS
    29. Cassing, J H & Hillman, A L & Long, N V, 1986. "Risk Aversion, Terms of Trade Uncertainty and Social-Consensus Trade Policy," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 38(2), pages 234-42, July.
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