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The Political Economy of Trade Policy in China

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  • Bin, Sheng

    (Nankai University)

Abstract

Most of economists, who prefer either the classical trade theory or the latest emerging new trade theory, adhere to the doctrine of free trade. However, the perplexity between the theoretical ideology and ever-lasting protectionism in reality demonstrates that the political decision-making process of trade policy is often less understood or even ignored. Political economy of trade policy, or simply called endogenous tariff theory, may offer a plausible and decent answer to the dilemma from the perspective of income distribution, rather than economic efficiency.

Suggested Citation

  • Bin, Sheng, 2000. "The Political Economy of Trade Policy in China," Working Papers 10/2000, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Management, Politics & Philosophy.
    • Handle: RePEc:hhb:cbslpf:2000_010
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    File URL: http://openarchive.cbs.dk/handle/10398/6305
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Keywords

    China; Political economy; Trade liberalization; Trade policy; Trade protection;
    All these keywords.

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