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The Political Economy of Trade Policy in China

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Listed author(s):
  • Bin, Sheng

    (Nankai University)

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    Abstract

    Most of economists, who prefer either the classical trade theory or the latest emerging new trade theory, adhere to the doctrine of free trade. However, the perplexity between the theoretical ideology and ever-lasting protectionism in reality demonstrates that the political decision-making process of trade policy is often less understood or even ignored. Political economy of trade policy, or simply called endogenous tariff theory, may offer a plausible and decent answer to the dilemma from the perspective of income distribution, rather than economic efficiency.

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    File URL: http://openarchive.cbs.dk/handle/10398/6305
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    Paper provided by Copenhagen Business School, Department of Management, Politics & Philosophy in its series Working Papers with number 10/2000.

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    Length: 67 pages
    Date of creation: 01 Aug 2000
    Handle: RePEc:hhb:cbslpf:2000_010
    Contact details of provider: Postal:
    Department of Management, Politics and Philosophy, Copenhagen Business School, Blaagaardsgade 23 B, DK-2200 Copenhagen N, Denmark

    Phone: +45 3815 3815
    Web page: http://www.cbs.dk/departments/mpp/
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    Keywords: China; Political economy; Trade liberalization; Trade policy; Trade protection;

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

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