Political Economy of Tariff Protection in Russia: an Empirical Study
Import liberalization forms part and parcel of trade reforms in transition economies. There are, however, significant differences among post-communist countries in the degree of import liberalization. What factors govern the evolution of import tariff policy during the transition period? This empirical study shows that the most adequate explanation of the tariff structure in Russia could be provided by the hypothesis which stresses government desire to provide support for stagnant industries as well as to maximize tariff revenues. This “stagnant industries — tariff revenues” mechanism is likely to contribute to lowering tariff rates with the further developments of microeconomic and budgetary adjustment.
|Date of creation:||02 Jun 2000|
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