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Departure from Free Trade: A Survey

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  • Hillman, Arye L.

Abstract

This Paper surveys the ways in which departures from free trade have been treated in economic analysis. Normative theories linked to classical arguments have shown how departure from free trade can enhance efficiency and increase social welfare. Positive perspectives with links to political-economy premises of public choice view departure from free trade as socially undesirable and consider why governments nonetheless at times choose not to adhere to free trade. In the first case, models propose how choosing to depart from free trade can be in the public interest. In the second case, decisions by government to depart from free trade are viewed as compromising the public interest. The distinctions provide the basis for an interpretive path through the literature on international trade policy.

Suggested Citation

  • Hillman, Arye L., 2003. "Departure from Free Trade: A Survey," CEPR Discussion Papers 3707, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3707
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    free trade; political interests; protection; public interest; special interests; strategic trade policy;

    JEL classification:

    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations

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