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The political economy of antidumping: A survey

  • Nelson, Douglas

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Journal of Political Economy.

Volume (Year): 22 (2006)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
Pages: 554-590

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Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:22:y:2006:i:3:p:554-590
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505544

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