Political pressure deflection
Much economic policy is deliberately shifted away from direct political processes to administrative processes-political pressure deflection. Pressure deflection poses a puzzle to standard political economy models which suggest that having policies to 'sell' is valuable to politicians. The puzzle is solved here by showing that incumbents will favor pressure deflection since it can deter viability of a challenger, essentially like entry deterrence. U.S. trade policy since 1934 provides a prime example, especially antidumping law and its evolution. © 2009 The Author(s).
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|Date of creation:||2009|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in: Public choice (2009) v.141,p.129-150|
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