Political pressure deflection
Much economic policy is deliberately shifted away from direct political processes to administrative processes-political pressure deflection. Pressure deflection poses a puzzle to standard political economy models which suggest that having policies to 'sell' is valuable to politicians. The puzzle is solved here by showing that incumbents will favor pressure deflection since it can deter viability of a challenger, essentially like entry deterrence. U.S. trade policy since 1934 provides a prime example, especially antidumping law and its evolution. © 2009 The Author(s).
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||2009|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in: Public choice (2009) v.141,p.129-150|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: CP135, 50, avenue F.D. Roosevelt, 1050 Bruxelles|
Web page: http://difusion.ulb.ac.be
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Enriqueta Aragonés & Zvika Neeman, 1994.
"Strategic ambiguity in electoral competition,"
Economics Working Papers
162, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Apr 1996.
- Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg & Giovanni Maggi, 1997.
"Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation,"
NBER Working Papers
5942, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Alberto Alesina & Alex Cukierman, 1987.
"The Politics of Ambiguity,"
NBER Working Papers
2468, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Magee,Stephen P. & Brock,William A. & Young,Leslie, 1989.
"Black Hole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory,"
Cambridge University Press, number 9780521377003, June.
- Grossman, G-M & Helpman, E, 1996.
"Competing for Endorsements,"
182, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs.
- Grossman, G.M. & Helpman, E., 1998. "Competing for Endorsements," Papers 09-98, Tel Aviv.
- Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 1996. "Competing for Endorsements," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1784, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Grossman, Gene & Helpman, Elhanan, 1996. "Competing for Endorsements," CEPR Discussion Papers 1546, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- James E. Anderson, 1993.
"Domino Dumping, II: Anti-dumping,"
Boston College Working Papers in Economics
219, Boston College Department of Economics.
- Kishore Gawande & Usree Bandyopadhyay, 2000. "Is Protection for Sale? Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman Theory of Endogenous Protection," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 82(1), pages 139-152, February.
- Dixit, Avinash & Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1997.
"Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Government Policy Making,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(4), pages 752-69, August.
- Dixit, Avinash & Grossman, Gene M. & Helpman, Elhanan, 1997. "Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Government Policy Making," Scholarly Articles 3450061, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, 1986. "Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 101(1), pages 1-31.
- Grossman, G.M. & Helpman, E., 1992.
"Protection for Sale,"
21-92, Tel Aviv.
- Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 1992. "Protection For Sale," NBER Working Papers 4149, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Grossman, G.M. & Helpman, E., 1992. "Protection for Sale," Papers 162, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs.
- Grossman, Gene & Helpman, Elhanan, 1993. "Protection for Sale," CEPR Discussion Papers 827, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Bruce A. Blonigen & Thomas J. Prusa, 2001. "Antidumping," NBER Working Papers 8398, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Finger, J M & Hall, H Keith & Nelson, Douglas R, 1982. "The Political Economy of Administered Protection," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(3), pages 452-66, June.
- James E. Anderson & Thomas J. Prusa, 2001. "Political Market Structure," NBER Working Papers 8371, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Gallaway, Michael P. & Blonigen, Bruce A. & Flynn, Joseph E., 1999. "Welfare costs of the U.S. antidumping and countervailing duty laws," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 211-244, December.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ulb:ulbeco:2013/136351. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Benoit Pauwels)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.