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Interest groups and politics: The need to concentrate on group formation

  • Reuben E.

    (University of Amsterdam & Tinbergen Institute)

This paper assesses the development of the modeling of group behavior in the interest group literature. Throughout the literature, interest groups have been modeled in multiple ways: from passive groups that do not interact with one another to groups that act just as rational strategic players. Although there has been considerable progress and models are increasingly more realistic and successful at explaining political outcomes, we still have a long way to go. In this paper, I propose that the introduction of group formation into our models is the best way of continuing with research.

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File URL: http://econwpa.repec.org/eps/pe/papers/0212/0212001.pdf
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Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Public Economics with number 0212001.

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Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: 12 Dec 2002
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:0212001
Note: Type of Document - PDF; prepared on IBM PC; to print on PostScript; pages: 24; figures: included. PDF, 14 pages
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://econwpa.repec.org

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