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Does Centralization Increase the Size of Government? The Effects of Separation of Powers and Lobbying

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  • Isidoro Mazza
  • Frans Winden

Abstract

Difficulties faced by the Economic and Monetary Union have strengthened the position of those who advocate a process of (further) political integration in the European Union (EU). A widespread fear is, though, that such a process would favor powerful interest groups able to lobby the EU policymakers. Persson and Tabellini (1994) argue that political centralization will increase the size of the government through lobbying because of free-riding incentives created by federally funded programs with localized benefits. We extend their analysis by presenting a model where the budgeting process is divided into two stages, instead of one, which better captures the EU institutional framework. A federal legislator (the Council) chooses the size of the budget at one stage, while a federal agency (the Commission) chooses the allocation of the budget at the next stage. We show that separation of powers in the budgeting process restricts free riding and, therefore, reduces the incentives to lobby. The result is an unchanged budget under centralization. Moreover, it is shown that if the lobbying activity is directed to both policymakers, competitive lobbying may actually reduce the size of the public sector under centralized policymaking. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2002

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  • Isidoro Mazza & Frans Winden, 2002. "Does Centralization Increase the Size of Government? The Effects of Separation of Powers and Lobbying," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 9(4), pages 379-389, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:itaxpf:v:9:y:2002:i:4:p:379-389
    DOI: 10.1023/A:1016559801671
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    Cited by:

    1. Giardina, Emilio & Cavalieri, Marina & Guccio, Calogero & Mazza, Isidoro, 2009. "Federalism, Party Competition and Budget Outcome: Empirical Findings on Regional Health Expenditure in Italy," MPRA Paper 16437, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Ryo Ishida, 2012. "The Effect of Tax Credit on Politically Distorted Allocations: A Theoretical Approach," Discussion papers ron234, Policy Research Institute, Ministry of Finance Japan, revised Jun 2012.
    3. Robert Dur & Hein Roelfsema, 2005. "Why does centralisation fail to internalise policy externalities?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 122(3), pages 395-416, March.
    4. H.J. Roelfsema, 2004. "Legislative Bargaining and Lobbying in the European Union," Working Papers 04-16, Utrecht School of Economics.
    5. Mazza, Isidoro & van Winden, Frans, 2008. "An endogenous policy model of hierarchical government," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 133-149, January.
    6. Reuben E., 2002. "Interest groups and politics: The need to concentrate on group formation," Public Economics 0212001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Martin Gregor, 2008. "Rozpočtová pravidla a rozpočtový proces: Teorie, empirie a realita České republiky [Budgetary rules and budget process: Theory, empirics, and the case of the Czech Republic]," Politická ekonomie, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2008(4), pages 484-504.
    8. Di Vita Giuseppe, 2015. "Centralization versus Decentralization of Legislative Production and the Effect on Litigation: A Case Study," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 11(2), pages 267-291, July.

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