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Endogenous Lobbying

  • Leonardo Felli

    (London School of Economics.)

  • Antonio Merlo

    (University of Pennsylvania.)

In this article, we present a citizen-candidate model of representative democracy with endogenouslobbying.We find that lobbying induces policy compromise and always affects equilibrium policy outcomes. In particular, even though the policy preferences of lobbies are relatively extreme, lobbying biases the outcome of the political process toward the center of the policy space, and extreme policies cannot emerge in equilibrium. Moreover, in equilibrium, not all lobbies participate in the policy-making process. (JEL: D72, D74, D78) Copyright (c) 2006 by the European Economic Association.

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Article provided by MIT Press in its journal Journal of the European Economic Association.

Volume (Year): 4 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 (03)
Pages: 180-215

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Handle: RePEc:tpr:jeurec:v:4:y:2006:i:1:p:180-215
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  1. Daniel Diermeier & Michael Keane & Antonio Merlo, 2002. "A Political Economy Model of Congressional Careers," PIER Working Paper Archive 04-037, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 01 Sep 2004.
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