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Are we witnessing a paradigm shift in the analysis of political competition?

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  • Fabio Padovano

Abstract

This presidential address assesses the crisis of the Downsian model of political competition in light of the mounting evidence on policy divergence and evaluates the possibility that the new theories of politicians’ quality and political selection provide an alternative theoretical conceptualization of political competition. Based on a critical review of the literature and on the author’s works on content analysis of policy speeches, income redistribution, politicians’ quality, and political legislation cycles, this address concludes that multidimensional Downsian models of political competition are adequate to explain policy divergence and points out the serious theoretical and empirical problems that models of political selection have to solve. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2013

Suggested Citation

  • Fabio Padovano, 2013. "Are we witnessing a paradigm shift in the analysis of political competition?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 156(3), pages 631-651, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:156:y:2013:i:3:p:631-651
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-012-9920-5
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Paradigm shift; Downsian model; Median voter; Political competition; Regression discontinuity design; Political selection; Citizen-candidate model; Policy convergence; Redistribution; Political legislation cycle; B41; H11; C21; D72; D78; D79;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B41 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology - - - Economic Methodology
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • C21 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Cross-Sectional Models; Spatial Models; Treatment Effect Models
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • D79 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Other

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