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Equilibrium in Multicandidate Probabilistic Spatial Voting

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  • Lin, Tse-Min
  • Enelow, James M
  • Dorussen, Han

Abstract

This paper presents a multicandidate spatial model of probabilistic voting in which voter utility functions contain a random element specific to each candidate. The model assumes no abstentions, sincere voting, and the maximization of expected vote by each candidate. The authors derive a sufficient condition for concavity of the candidate expected vote function with which the existence of equilibrium is related to the degree of voter uncertainty. They show that, under concavity, convergent equilibrium exists at a 'minimum-sum point' at which total distances from all voter ideal points are minimized. The authors then discuss the location of convergent equilibrium for various measures of distance. In their examples, computer analysis indicates that nonconvergent equilibria are only locally stable and disappear as voter uncertainty increases. Copyright 1999 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

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  • Lin, Tse-Min & Enelow, James M & Dorussen, Han, 1999. "Equilibrium in Multicandidate Probabilistic Spatial Voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 98(1-2), pages 59-82, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:98:y:1999:i:1-2:p:59-82
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Zakharov Alexei, 2005. "Candidate location and endogenous valence," EERC Working Paper Series 05-17e, EERC Research Network, Russia and CIS.
    2. Aragonès, Enriqueta & Xefteris, Dimitrios, 2017. "Voters' private valuation of candidates' quality," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, pages 121-130.
    3. Haldun Evrenk & Dmitriy Kha, 2011. "Three-candidate spatial competition when candidates have valence: stochastic voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 147(3), pages 421-438, June.
    4. Haldun Evrenk, 2009. "Three-candidate competition when candidates have valence: the base case," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 32(1), pages 157-168, January.
    5. Xefteris, Dimitrios, 2017. "Multidimensional electoral competition between differentiated candidates," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 112-121.
    6. John R. Freeman & Jude C. Hays & Helmut Stix, 1999. "Democracy and Markets: The Case of Exchange Rates," Working Papers 39, Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian Central Bank).
    7. Köppl-Turyna, Monika, 2014. "Campaign finance regulations and policy convergence: The role of interest groups and valence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 1-19.
    8. Norman Schofield, 2006. "Equilibria in the spatial stochastic model of voting with party activists," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 10(3), pages 183-203, December.
    9. Bernard Grofman & Orestis Troumpounis & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2016. "Electoral competition with primaries and quality asymmetries," Working Papers 135286117, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.
    10. Tridimas, George & Winer, Stanley L., 2005. "The political economy of government size," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 643-666, September.
    11. Fabio Padovano, 2013. "Are we witnessing a paradigm shift in the analysis of political competition?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 156(3), pages 631-651, September.
    12. Edward Wesep, 2012. "Defensive Politics," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 151(3), pages 425-444, June.
    13. Norman Schofield & Maria Gallego & Ugur Ozdemir & Alexei Zakharov, 2011. "Competition for popular support: a valence model of elections in Turkey," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 36(3), pages 451-482, April.
    14. McKelvey, Richard D. & Patty, John W., 2006. "A theory of voting in large elections," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 155-180, October.
    15. Aidt, T.S. & Dutta, J., 2008. "Electoral Uncertainty and Public Goods," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0843, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    16. Winer, Stanley L. & Ferris, J. Stephen, 2008. "Searching for Keynesianism," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 294-316, June.
    17. Luigi Curini, 2015. "Explaining party ideological stances," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 162(1), pages 79-96, January.
    18. Narwa, Daniel, 2001. "How general should the proximity model be?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 53-74, March.
    19. Alexei Zakharov & Constantine Sorokin, 2014. "Policy convergence in a two-candidate probabilistic voting model," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 43(2), pages 429-446, August.
    20. Fernandez, Jose & Cataiefe, Guido, 2009. "Model of the 2000 Presidential Election: Instrumenting for Ideology," MPRA Paper 16264, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    21. Evrenk, Haldun, 2010. "Three-Candidate Spatial Competition When Candidates Have Valence: Asymmetric Voter Density and Plurality Maximization," Working Papers 2010-1, Suffolk University, Department of Economics.
    22. Benček, David, 2016. "Opportunistic candidates and knowledgeable voters: A recipe for extreme views," Kiel Working Papers 2047, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW).

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