Government turnover in parliamentary democracies
In this paper we consider a dynamic model of government formation and termination in parliamentary democracies. Our analysis accounts for the following observed phenomena: (1) Cabinet reshuffles; (2) Cabinet replacements; (3) Early elections; (4) surplus governments; (5) Minority governments; (6) The relative instability of minority governments.
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- Diermeier, Daniel & Merlo, Antonio, 2004.
"An empirical investigation of coalitional bargaining procedures,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 88(3-4), pages 783-797, March.
- Daniel Diermeier & Antoni Merlo, 1999. "An Empirical Investigation of Coalitional Bargaining Procedures," Discussion Papers 1267, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Antonio Merlo & Charles Wilson, 1997. "Efficient delays in a stochastic model of bargaining," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 11(1), pages 39-55.
- James M. Snyder, 1991. "On Buying Legislatures," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 3(2), pages 93-109, 07. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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