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The Effects of Constitutions on Coalition Governments in Parliamentary Democracies

  • Daniel Diermeier


    (Kellogg School of Management,Northwestern University)

  • Hulya Eraslan


    (Finance, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania)

  • Antonio Merlo


    (Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania)

In this article we present an overview of our recent research on the effects of constitutions on coalition governments in parliamentary democracies. Our approach is based on the solution and estimation of a multilateral bargaining model which we use to investigate the consequences of constitutional features of parliamentary democracy for the formation and stability of coalition governments.

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Paper provided by Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania in its series PIER Working Paper Archive with number 03-037.

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Length: 39 pages
Date of creation: 01 Dec 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:pen:papers:03-037
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  1. Torsten Persson & Gerard Roland & Guido Tabellini, 2000. "Comparative Politics and Public Finance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(6), pages 1121-1161, December.
  2. Myerson Roger B., 1993. "Effectiveness of Electoral Systems for Reducing Government Corruption: A Game-Theoretic Analysis," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 118-132, January.
  3. repec:tpr:qjecon:v:106:y:1991:i:2:p:407-43 is not listed on IDEAS
  4. Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, 1997. "Political Economics and Macroeconomic Policy," NBER Working Papers 6329, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Diermeier, Daniel & Merlo, Antonio, 2000. "Government Turnover in Parliamentary Democracies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 94(1), pages 46-79, September.
  6. Diermeier, Daniel & Eraslan, Hulya & Merlo, Antonio, 2002. "Coalition governments and comparative constitutional design," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(4-5), pages 893-907, May.
  7. Robert J. Barro, 1989. "Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries," NBER Working Papers 3120, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Torsten Persson & Gerard Roland & Guido Tabellini, 2003. "How Do Electoral Rules Shape Party Structures, Government Coalitions and Economic Policies?," Working Papers 251, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
  9. Merlo, Antonio & Wilson, Charles A, 1995. "A Stochastic Model of Sequential Bargaining with Complete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(2), pages 371-99, March.
  10. repec:tpr:qjecon:v:112:y:1997:i:4:p:1163-1202 is not listed on IDEAS
  11. Daniel Diermeier & Antoni Merlo, 1999. "An Empirical Investigation of Coalitional Bargaining Procedures," Discussion Papers 1267, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  12. Merlo, A., 1992. "Bargaining Over Governments in a Stochastic Environment," Working Papers 92-55, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  13. Antonio Merlo & Daniel Diermeier & Hülya Eraslan, 2004. "Bicameralism and Government Formation," Working Papers 2004.81, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  14. Alberto Alesina & Sule Ozler & Nouriel Roubini & Phillip Swagel, 1992. "Political Instability and Economic Growth," NBER Working Papers 4173, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  15. Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, 2005. "The Economic Effects of Constitutions," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262661926, June.
  16. Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 2003. "Centralized versus decentralized provision of local public goods: a political economy approach," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(12), pages 2611-2637, December.
  17. Antonio Merlo & Charles Wilson, 1997. "Efficient delays in a stochastic model of bargaining," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 39-55.
  18. Torsten Persson & Gerard Roland & Guido Tabellini, . "Separation of Powers and Political Accountability," Working Papers 100, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
  19. Daniel Diermeier & Hulya Eraslan & Antonio Merlo, 2003. "A Structural Model of Government Formation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(1), pages 27-70, January.
  20. Antonio Merlo, 1998. "Economic Dynamics And Government Stability In Postwar Italy," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 80(4), pages 629-637, November.
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