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Political Instability and Economic Growth

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  • Roubini, Nouriel
  • Swagel, Phillip
  • Ozler, Sule
  • Alesina, Alberto

Abstract

This paper investigates the relationship between political instability and per capita GDP growth in a sample of 113 countries for the period 1950 through 1982. We define political instability as the propensity of a government collapse, and we estimate a model in which such a measure of political instability and economic growth are jointly determined. The main result of this paper is that in countries and time periods with a high propensity of government collapse, growth is significantly lower than otherwise. We also discuss the effects of different types of government changes on growth.

Suggested Citation

  • Roubini, Nouriel & Swagel, Phillip & Ozler, Sule & Alesina, Alberto, 1996. "Political Instability and Economic Growth," Scholarly Articles 4553024, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:hrv:faseco:4553024
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    References listed on IDEAS

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