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Bargaining over Governments in a Stochastic Environment

  • Merlo, Antonio

In this paper, the author structurally estimates a stochastic bargaining model of government formation in a multiparty parliamentary democracy and he conducts policy experiments to evaluate the effects of changes in the bargaining procedure. The author shows that the model fits data on the duration of negotiations and government durations in postwar Italy well. Also, he shows that changes in the proposer selection process would not affect either the duration of negotiations or government durations, whereas the imposition of a strict deadline would in general reduce the incentives to delay agreement as well as government durations. Copyright 1997 by the University of Chicago.

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Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Political Economy.

Volume (Year): 105 (1997)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
Pages: 101-31

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Handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:105:y:1997:i:1:p:101-31
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  1. Ariel Rubinstein, 2010. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Levine's Working Paper Archive 252, David K. Levine.
  2. Flinn, C. & Heckman, J., 1982. "New methods for analyzing structural models of labor force dynamics," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 115-168, January.
  3. Merlo, Antonio & Wilson, Charles A, 1995. "A Stochastic Model of Sequential Bargaining with Complete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(2), pages 371-99, March.
  4. Merlo, Antonio, 1991. "An Econometric Analysis of Government Tenure Histories: The Italian Case," Working Papers 91-28, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  5. Austen-Smith, David & Banks, Jeffrey., 1987. "Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes," Working Papers 643, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  6. Kennan, John, 1995. "Repeated contract negotiations with private information," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 7(4), pages 447-472, November.
  7. Antonio Merlo & Charles Wilson, 1997. "Efficient delays in a stochastic model of bargaining," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 39-55.
  8. Cramton, Peter C & Tracy, Joseph S, 1992. "Strikes and Holdouts in Wage Bargaining: Theory and Data," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(1), pages 100-121, March.
  9. Eckstein, Zvi & Wolpin, Kenneth I, 1995. "Duration to First Job and the Return to Schooling: Estimates from a Search-Matching Model," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 62(2), pages 263-86, April.
  10. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2005. "Bargaining and Markets," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000515, UCLA Department of Economics.
  11. Kennan, John & Wilson, Robert, 1993. "Bargaining with Private Information," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 31(1), pages 45-104, March.
  12. Lippman, Steven A. & McCall, John J., 1976. "Job search in a dynamic economy," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 365-390, June.
  13. Kennan, John & Wilson, Robert, 1989. "Strategic Bargaining Models and Interpretation of Strike Data," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 4(S), pages S87-130, Supplemen.
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