Strikes and Holdouts in Wage Bargaining: Theory and Data
The authors develop a private-information model of union contract negotiations in which disputes signal a firm's willingness-to-pay. Previous models have assumed that all labor disputes take the form of a strike. Yet a prominent feature of U.S. collective bargaining is the holdout: negotiations often continue without a strike after the contract has expired. Production continues with workers paid accordingly to the expired contract. The authors analyze the union's decision to strike or hold out and highlight its importance to strike activity. Strikes are more likely to occur after a drop in the real wage or a decline in unemployment. Copyright 1992 by American Economic Association.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 82 (1992)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://www.aeaweb.org/aer/|
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:||Web: https://www.aeaweb.org/subscribe.html|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Peter Cramton, 1992.
"Strategic Delay in Bargaining with Two-Sided Uncertainty,"
Papers of Peter Cramton
92res, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 09 Jun 1998.
- Peter C. Cramton, 1992. "Strategic Delay in Bargaining with Two-Sided Uncertainty," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 59(1), pages 205-225.
- Crawford, Vincent P, 1982. "A Theory of Disagreement in Bargaining," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(3), pages 607-637, May.
- Holden, S., 1990. "A Bargaining Theory Of Inflation," Memorandum 13/1990, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
- Raquel Fernandez & Jacob Glazer, 1989.
"Striking for a Bargain Between Two Completely Informed Agents,"
NBER Working Papers
3108, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Fernandez, Raquel & Glazer, Jacob, 1991. "Striking for a Bargain between Two Completely Informed Agents," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(1), pages 240-252, March.
- Haller, Hans & Holden, Steinar, 1990. "A letter to the editor on wage bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 232-236, October.
- Ariel Rubinstein, 2010.
"Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
661465000000000387, David K. Levine.
- Herbert R. Northrup, 1971. "The Railway Labor Act: A Critical Reappraisal," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 25(1), pages 3-31, October.
- Bruce E. Kaufman, 1981. "Bargaining Theory, Inflation, and Cyclical Strike Activity in Manufacturing," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 34(3), pages 333-355, April.
- Anat R. Admati & Motty Perry, 1987. "Strategic Delay in Bargaining," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 54(3), pages 345-364.
- Oliver Hart, 1989. "Bargaining and Strikes," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 104(1), pages 25-43.
- Martin J. Mauro, 1982. "Strikes as a Result of Imperfect Information," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 35(4), pages 522-538, July.
- Gunderson, Morley & Kervin, John & Reid, Frank, 1986. "Logit Estimates of Strike Incidence from Canadian Contract Data," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 4(2), pages 257-276, April.
- Peter Cramton, 1991.
"Dynamic Bargaining with Transaction Costs,"
Papers of Peter Cramton
91ms, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 15 Jun 1998.
- Ashenfelter, Orley & Johnson, George E, 1969. "Bargaining Theory, Trade Unions, and Industrial Strike Activity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 59(1), pages 35-49, March.
- David Card, 1988. "Strikes and Wages: A Test of a Signalling Model," NBER Working Papers 2550, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Harrison, Alan & Stewart, Mark, 1989. "Cyclical Fluctuations in Strike Durations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(4), pages 827-841, September.
- Roth, Alvin E & Murnighan, J Keith & Schoumaker, Francoise, 1988. "The Deadline Effect in Bargaining: Some Experimental Evidence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 806-823, September.
- McConnell, Sheena, 1989. "Strikes, Wages, and Private Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(4), pages 801-815, September.
- Brian P. McCall, 1990. "Interest Arbitration and the Incentive to Bargain," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 34(1), pages 151-167, March.
- Binmore, K. & Osborne, M.J. & Rubinstein, A., 1989.
"Noncooperative Models Of Bargaining,"
89-26, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory.
- Binmore, Ken & Osborne, Martin J. & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1992. "Noncooperative models of bargaining," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 7, pages 179-225 Elsevier.
- Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2005. "Bargaining and Markets," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000515, UCLA Department of Economics.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:82:y:1992:i:1:p:100-121. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jane Voros)or (Michael P. Albert)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.